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We study games of public delegated common agency under asymmetric information. Us-
ing tools from non-smooth analysis and optimal control, we derive best responses and
characterize equilibria (both continuous and discontinuous) using self-generating opti-
mization programs of which any equilibrium allocation must be a solution. Special atten-
tion is given to common agency games in which each principal’s payoff is a linear function
of the agent’s action. In such games the self-generating optimization program reduces
to the maximization of the principals’ “aggregate” virtual surplus in which the agent’s
marginal valuation is replaced by a confluence of “virtual” valuations that reflect com-
mon agency problems. One noteworthy subset of equilibrium allocations are “virtually
truthful” which are the incomplete-information generalization of Bernheim and Whin-
ston’s (1986) “truthful” equilibria. Virtually-truthful equilibria are simple to calculate
and illustrate two distinct sources of equilibrium distortion: inefficient contracting by a
given coalition of active principals and inefficient participation (insufficient activity) by
principals. Our results are illustrated by means of two games: a public goods game in
which each player simultaneously offers a menu contract to a common provider of the
public good in order to induce greater supply, and a lobbying game between conflicting
interest groups in which each group offers a menu of contributions to a common political
decision-maker in an attempt to influence policymaking.
Keywords: Common agency, asymmetric information, menu auc-
tions, delegated contracting games, public goods, lobbying.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper considers a large class of multi-principal, common-agent games in which
(i) the agent has private information at the time of contracting, (ii) any of the agent’s
actions may be contracted on by any principal (i.e., contracting variables are public),
and (iii) the agent is free to accept any subset of contract offers from the principals
(i.e., the degree of common agency is endogenous and delegated to the agent). Two
motivating examples which we consider are the private provision of public goods and
influence activities by lobbyists. In the public goods example, the principals are a set
of citizens, each of who may offer a contract to a common, privately-informed producer
to make a payment as a function of the total public good produced; all of the citizens
agree that more public good is better, but the strength of each citizen’s preference for
the public good may differ. In the lobbying example, the set of principals correspond
to lobbyists with (possibly opposite) preferences over a politician’s decision; each
1We thank seminar participants in Zu¨rich, Toulouse, the 5th CSEF-IGIER Symposium in Eco-
nomic Theory in Capri, ESEM-Barcelona 2009, Bocconi University of Milan, Princeton, University
of Pennsylvania, Paris School of Economics, Bologne, University College of London, Ohio State Uni-
versity, Montpellier, the CEPR Applied Industrial Organization 2010 and the Cowles Foundation
Economic Theory Summer 2011 Conference for their helpful remarks. We are especially thankful to
David Rahman for comments and to John Birge, Philippe Jehiel, Stephano Lovo and Aggey Semenov
for many helpful discussions. Some results and applications have been taken from our previous paper,
“Common Agency Games with Common Screening Devices,” (2005).
aParis School of Economics-EHESS, david.martimort@parisschoolofeconomics.eu
bUniversity of Chicago Booth School of Business,lars.stole@chicagobooth.edu
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lobbyist promises contributions to the politician as a function of the latter’s publicly
observed vote. As we will see, whether the principals’ preferences are congruent (e.g.,
preferences for public goods) or in opposition (e.g., lobbyists on the left and right of
a policy issue) will determine the character of the equilibrium distortions.
To obtain a characterization of the equilibria for this class of games, there are four
conceptual and technical difficulties that must be overcome. First, even if the agent’s
non-participation option yields a type-independent payoff, the agent’s participation
constraint vis-a`-vis principal i will typically be type dependent if the agent’s best
alternative is to contract with a subset of the remaining principals. Moreover, the
value of the partial-contracting option is an endogenous object. Second, the set of
principals who are actively influencing a particular agent type (i.e., making positive
payments to that agent type in equilibrium) is also an endogenous object that must
be constructed as part of the equilibrium. As we will see, it is not uncommon for
each principal’s activity set (i.e., the set of types to whom positive transfers are
made) to be a proper subset of the agent’s type space and to differ fundamentally
from each other. This subtlety is novel to delegated common agency games with
adverse selection. Third, the appropriate strategy spaces in these games are large
– in the present case, the set of upper semi-continuous functions from actions to
transfers. Unfortunately, standard control-theoretic results require that the principals’
objective functions are continuous and differentiable. Because principal i’s objective
function depends upon the equilibrium transfer functions of the other principals, this
smoothness restriction would require each principal to choose a differentiable transfer
function. Thus, using standard control techniques in this context is implicitly making
an equilibrium refinement that perhaps is unpalatable. Regardless, such a refinement
should be made explicitly and its implications thoroughly understood. To this end
we import and specialize the modern techniques of non-smooth analysis in optimal
control allowing for discontinuous transfers. Lastly, most games in this class have a
multiplicity of equilibria, so we would like theorems broadly applicable to the entire
equilibrium set or, if this is not possible, theorems applicable to an important subset
of equilibria where the equilibrium refinement is carefully considered.
This paper addresses each of these four difficulties and contributes in several di-
mensions. First, to address type-dependent optimization problems with non-smooth
objective functions, we derive a novel set of necessary and sufficient conditions for ob-
jectives which require only linearity in the state variable – an assumption satisfied in
most contracting problems in which payoffs are quasi-linear in money. This theorem,
stated generally and proven in Appendix B, is of independent interest to common
agency games.
Using the non-smooth control theorem, we are able to establish broad necessary
conditions for any equilibrium outcome. This is achieved by noting that our class of
common agency games is a special case of an aggregate game with infinite-dimensional
strategy spaces. Using the principle of aggregate concurrence, a recent result from the
aggregate games literature (Martimort and Stole 2011), we are able to state several
useful necessary conditions which apply to the set of all equilibrium allocations (i.e.,
all equilibrium actions and agent-rent profiles). Indeed, given the activity sets of the
principals, these necessary conditions provide sharp predictions.
To address the endogeneity of the principals’ activity sets, we place additional struc-
ture on the payoffs of players – in short, we require that each principal’s marginal
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return to the agent’s action is constant. Within this class of common agency games,
we are able to demonstrate equilibrium existence and characterize the distortions
caused by non-cooperative contracting. This class of equilibria includes discontin-
uous equilibria as well as a subclass of equilibria which we call virtually truthful.
For this subclass, we provide a complete characterization of equilibria. We find that
these equilibria share remarkable similarities with the Lindahl-Samuelson allocations
from public finance and, remarkably, are solutions to a virtual-surplus maximization
problem in the spirit of Myerson’s (1981) optimal auction program. These equilib-
rium outcomes are extremely simple to calculate and comparative statics are imme-
diately available. Moreover, as private information becomes less disperse the limiting
equilibrium allocation is the truthful equilibrium allocation of Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1986a). In this sense, virtually-truthful allocations are generalizations of the
complete-information concept. We apply these results to our motivating examples of
public goods games and lobbying games to explore the role of congruence and conflict
in the principals’ preferences.
Literature review
There is an existing literature on common agency games with public contracting
variables. Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) initiated the study of such games (re-
ferred to as “menu auctions” in that paper) and their results about the existence
and properties of truthful equilibria have been successfully applied to many contexts,
including international trade and lobbying.1. There is also a less developed literature
that has looked at intrinsic common agency games with public contracting variable in
the context of moral hazard. Bernheim and Whinston (1986b) provided the first appli-
cation in this framework. Later papers by Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1989) and Dixit
(1996) extended these insights to moral hazard games with linear contracts; more
recently, Martimort and Stole (2011) extend the model of Innes (1990) to a common
agency framework, proving equilibrium existence and characterizing the competitive
distortions.
The literature on common agency games with adverse selection is almost exclusively
limited to the case of private contracting.2 In a private contracting setting – i.e., a
game in which each principal is allowed to contract over a mutually exclusive subset
of agent actions – Martimort and Stole (2009a) provided a general analysis of compe-
tition with nonlinear prices under both delegated and intrinsic common agency with
endogenous activity sets. This is the appropriate class of models for games in which
each principal controls a specific screening variable (e.g., the quantity he sells to the
buyer) but does not observe the agent’s actions on other dimensions (e.g., the quantity
purchased from rivals).3 The focus in the present paper, however, is public agency en-
vironments where each principal has access to the same screening variables. A second
difference is that, in Martimort and Stole (2009a), manufacturers rank the agent’s
types the same way, with the agent having the highest valuation for both goods being
1Grossman, Helpman, Dixit, et al. (1997)
2A notable exception is Martimort (1996). Martimort (2007) introduces the distinction of private
and public common agency and previews the analysis in the present paper.
3Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) and Calzolari and Scarpa (2008) are earlier studies of delegated
common agency games with private contracting but focus a priori on cases where all types are
served.
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the most attractive for both manufacturers.4 The present analysis is more general
and allows for principals having conflicting preferences such as in our lobbying game.
Biais, Martimort and Rochet (2000) analyzed a model of competing market-makers
on financial markets with traders privately informed on their willingness to buy or
sell assets in a common value environment with private agency. Because of symmetry,
all market-makers have similar activity sets with a bid-ask spread such that traders
having a mild preference for trading do not trade under asymmetric information.
Organization
Section 2 presents our model of delegated common agency under asymmetric infor-
mation and some preliminary results characterizing each principal’s set of incentive
feasible allocations and constructing each principal’s best response as a solution to
a control problem using non-smooth analysis. Necessary and sufficient conditions
are presented in Section 3. The implications of these conditions for equilibria are
characterized in Section 4. Section 5 specializes to the case in which the principals’
preferences are linear in the agent’s action. This allows us to obtain closed form so-
lutions for the activity sets and to derive finer properties of equilibria. In Section 6,
we apply our findings to public good provision and lobbying games to illustrate the
nature of equilibrium distortions. In the former, we obtain an elegant recasting of
the Lindahl-Samuelson condition for public goods. In the latter, we derive a simple
condition characterizing which principals will exert exclusive influence over an agent
type and whether or not the principals’ spheres of influence will overlap. Section 7
concludes and highlights several avenues for further research. The proofs of the main
results are collected in Appendix A, together with a brief review of some useful re-
sults from convex analysis and non-smooth optimal control. A key theorem giving
necessary and sufficient conditions for non-smooth optimal control with linear state
variables is stated and proven in Appendix B.
2. THE MODEL
2.1. Public delegated agency games
Consider n principals indexed with the subscript i ∈ {1, .., n} = N . Each principal
offers a contribution schedule to a common agent who chooses the level of a public
good on their behalf. The set of feasible outputs is Q ≡ [qmin, qmax]. Under public
delegated common agency, the agent may also choose to contract with any subset of
principals.5
2.2. The strategic setting
Each principal i offers a contract ti ∈ T to the agent, which is assumed to be
an upper semicontinuous function that maps outputs into non-negative monetary
4Mezetti (1997) provided a model with conflicting and differentiated principals but his focus was
on an intrinsic common agency setting, putting aside the complete characterization of the activity
sets.
5This distinguishes our analysis from the case of intrinsic common agency (Martimort and Stole,
2011).
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payments.6 Because common agency is delegated and the agent would never accept
a contract stipulating a negative payment for an output he would like to choose, it
is without loss of generality to require nonnegative contracts. More precisely, any
equilibrium allocation supported by transfers that are not everywhere nonnegative is
also an equilibrium allocation for some transfers which are nonnegative everywhere.
2.3. Preferences
All players have quasi-linear preferences defined over outputs and payments. The
agent’s direct benefit from choosing q ∈ Q is denoted as
S0(q)− θq,
where S0 : Q → R and θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ, θ]. Principal i’s direct benefit from the choice
of q ∈ Q is denoted as Si(q), where again Si : Q → R. Throughout, the following
assumptions hold:
• The benefit functions S0, ... , Si, i ∈ N , are upper semi-continuous.
• The agent has private information about his type, θ ∈ Θ, whose distribution
is described by the absolutely continuous cumulative distribution function, F :
Θ → [0, 1], and bounded density function, f : Θ → R++. In addition, the
distribution of types satisfies a “generalized monotone hazard rate” property;
i.e.,
F (θ)− κ
f(θ)
is strictly increasing over Θ for any κ ∈ [0, 1].
• Any first-best optimal allocation,
qFB(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
n∑
i=0
Si(q)− θq,
is minimally separating; i.e., qFB(θ) < qFB(θ).
2.4. Timing and equilibrium
The delegated common agency game unfolds as follows. First, the agent learns
his private information θ. Second, principals non-cooperatively offer contracts to the
agent. Third, the agent accepts some set of the offers, chooses q and receives the
corresponding payments ti(q) required by the accepted offers.
We study the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria to this game. Formally, we define
equilibrium follows where we use an overline “ ” to denote an equilibrium component.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a profile of principals’ contribution schedules,
t = {t1, . . . , tn}, and an agent’s output strategy, q0(θ|t), such that the following prop-
erties hold.
6“Contracts on contracts” are not allowed because, for instance, principals j’s offers (j 6= i) are
non-observable by principal i. On the impact of such self-referencing contracts, see Peters and
Szentes (2011).
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1. Given any profile of contributions t ∈ T n, q0(θ|t) maximizes the agent’s payoff:
q0(θ|t) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq +
∑
i∈N
ti(q).
2. ti maximizes principal i’s expected payoff given t−i and q0:
ti ∈ arg max
ti∈T
∫
Θ
(Si(q0(θ|ti, t−i))− ti(q0(θ|ti, t−i)))f(θ)dθ.
2.5. Incentive feasible set
We now characterize the set of incentive feasible allocations available to princi-
pal i. Define the aggregate transfer functions T (q) ≡ ∑j∈N ti(q) and T−i(q) ≡∑
j∈N\{i} tj(q).
Definition 2 A rent-output profile (U, q), U : Θ → R+ and q : Θ → Q, is imple-
mentable by principal i given T−i if and only if there exists a contribution schedule
ti ∈ T such that
U(θ) = max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq + ti(q) + T−i(q),
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq + ti(q) + T−i(q).
We define the agent’s surplus from contracting with all principals but i for a given
equilibrium profile of aggregate transfers, T−i, as
U−i(θ) ≡ max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq + T−i(q).
Implementability can also be characterized in the dual space of indirect utilities:
Lemma 1 A rent-output profile (U, q) is implementable by principal i given an ag-
gregate equilibrium transfer profile, T−i, if and only if
(2.1) U(θ) ≥ U−i(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ,
(2.2) −q(θ) ∈ ∂U(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ,
(2.3) U is convex.
The notation “∂” in (2.2) denotes the subdifferential operator of a convex function.
Because U is convex, it is differentiable almost everywhere; at all such smooth points
the subdifferential is simply the gradient of U and we have U˙(θ) = −q(θ).7
7Condition (2.2) holds also for the rent/output profile (U−i(θ), q−i(θ)) since it is itself imple-
mentable (when Pi offers a null contribution) and for the status quo profile (U0(θ), q0(θ)) had no
principal offered any contract. This property is called “homogeneity” in Jullien (2000).
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2.6. Activity sets
Because contributions are non-negative, the agent is weakly better off accepting all
principals’ offers and (2.1) is satisfied. One important aspect of our analysis is to
determine precisely the subset of types where such contribution is indeed null.
Definition 3 Principal i’s equilibrium activity set is defined as
Θi ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ | U(θ) > U−i(θ)
}
.
The set of active principals for θ is given by the equilibrium activity map
α(θ) ≡ {i ∈ N | U(θ) > U−i(θ)} .
Note that Θi is open in Θ and principal i’s contribution is necessarily positive on his
activity set. We define the complement of Θi as Θ
c
i , i.e., the subset of types where the
participation constraint (2.1) is binding. The activity mapping α contains a complete
description of all equilibrium activity sets.
2.7. A non-smooth control problem
Principal i looks for an allocation that, at a best response, maximizes the joint
payoff of the bilateral coalition he forms with the agent,
Si(q) + S0(q) +
∑
j 6=i
tj(q)− θq,
minus the information rent, U(θ), that the type-θ agent retains. Of course, the
ability of principal i to extract this rent is limited by the agent’s option to contract
with other principals. More formally, we can state the relevant program for principal
i when facing the profile t−i as:
(Pi) : max
U∈AC(Θ,R)
q∈L(Θ,Q)
∫
Θ
(
Si(q(θ)) + S0(q(θ)) +
∑
j 6=i
tj(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
subject to (2.1), (2.2), (2.3),
where AC(Θ,R) denotes the set of all absolutely continuous, real functions with do-
main Θ and L(Θ,Q) is the space of measurable functions from Θ to Q.
3. OPTIMALITY CONDITIONS FOR BEST RESPONSES
We rely on a technical contribution which characterizes the solutions for non-smooth
optimal control problems with objectives that are linear in the state variable. This
result and its lengthy proof is presented in the Appendix as Theorem B.1. In short,
Theorem B.1 demonstrates that the necessary and sufficient conditions for programs
with twice continuously differentiable objectives that appear in Jullien (2000) gen-
eralize to programs with integrands which are simply upper semi-continuous. We
specialize the implications of Theorem B.1 to our setting in the following Theorem.
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Theorem 1 Given the profile of transfers offered by rival principals, t−i, the rent-
ouput profile (U, q) is a solution to (Pi) if and only if (U, q) satisfies (2.1), (2.2), (2.3)
and there exists a measure µi (possibly with mass points) defined over the Borel subsets
of Θ with an associated adjoint function, M i : Θ→ [0, 1],8 defined by M i(θ) = 0 and
for θ > θ,
M i(θ) ≡
∫
[θ,θ)
µi(dθ),
such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(3.1) supp {µi} ⊆ Θic ≡
{
θ |U(θ) = U−i(θ)
}
,
(3.2) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
Si(q) +S0(q) +
∑
j 6=i
tj(q) +
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ
)
q, a.e. θ ∈ Θ.
The conditions above for a best response do not yet characterize an equilibrium.
To do so, we need to derive more precise implications from these conditions. One
would like to describe both the equilibrium allocation and the corresponding adjoint
functions with only minimal reference to the n-tuple of equilibrium transfers which
implements them. Section 4 makes progress towards the first objective with necessary
conditions for equilibrium allocations being derived with respect to the aggregate
transfers and not their exact distribution among principals. Section 5 specializes the
principals’ preferences to derive even sharper predictions on adjoint functions and
equilibrium allocations.
4. EQUILIBRIA
4.1. General structure of equilibria
A remarkable implication of Theorem 1 that has immediate economic content can
be found by aggregating the optimality conditions (3.2) across all principals.9
Theorem 2 In any equilibrium of the delegated agency game with activity sets rep-
resented by α and the principals’ adjoint profile given by {M1, . . . ,Mn}, the allocation
satisfies the two conditions
(4.1) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq +
n∑
i=1
Si(q) +
n∑
i=1
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
+ (n − 1) (S0(q)− θq + T (q)) , a.e.;
(4.2) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq +
∑
i∈α(θ)
Si(q) +
∑
i∈α(θ)
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
+ (|α(θ)| − 1) (S0(q)− θq + T (q)) , a.e.
8M i is piecewise absolutely continuous, but might have jumps wherever µi has mass points.
9More generally, there is an aggregate concurrence property underlying the result in Theorem 2.
This idea is developed in Martimort and Stole (2011) and applied to other contracting games.
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Remarks: The objective function in (4.1) is obtained by summing over all principals
the optimality conditions (3.2). Proceeding similarly but over active principals only,
we obtain a more precise requirement in (4.2). The difference between the two is
that inactive principals do not change the agent’s decision; in other words, their
objectives are aligned with that of the agent given the contracts of active principals.
This congruence is captured by the joint requirement that an equilibrium allocation
satisfies (4.1) and (4.2).
Turning to this latter condition, the last term
(|α(θ)| − 1) (S0(q)− θq + T (q)) ,
is a multiple of the agent’s equilibrium maximand, which of course is maximized for
any incentive compatible allocation. If the transfers are continuously differentiable
around the equilibrium allocation, then the presence of this term in the maximand
is immaterial by the the agent’s first-order condition. We consider more subtle argu-
ments that allow for non-smooth equilibria below.
For the present, consider the first terms in (4.2)
S0(q)− θq +
∑
i∈α(θ)
Si(q) +
∑
i∈α(θ)
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q.
This simplified objective provides a remarkable intuition for the equilibrium alloca-
tion: it is as if the allocation q(θ) is chosen to maximize the collective surplus of the
agent and the principals in the active coalition α(θ) ⊆ N , less an information rent
term. This term, moreover, is a pointwise sum of the agent’s bilateral information
rents vis-a`-vis each active principal which captures the idea that agency problems are
compounded under delegated agency. If we define the average adjoint function across
the coalition as
MS(θ) ≡ 1|S|
∑
i∈S
M i(θ),
then the aggregate information rent term is |α(θ)| times larger than the rent term for
the average principal:∑
i∈α(θ)
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q = |α(θ)|
(
Mα(θ)(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q.
In particular, if each principal’s adjoint function M i is identical within the coalition,
which is the case if all principals do agree on the identity of the “worst” agent’s type
from their point of view, then the information rent term of the coalition is exactly
|α(θ)| times larger than the individual terms. Hence, all else equal, an |α(θ)|-fold
larger distortion is introduced. In this sense, the distortion is very similar to the
double-marginalization which arises in complementary vertical relationships.
While the preceding remarks are economically interesting, we must emphasize that α
is an endogenous object, so the necessary condition (4.2) is more insightful than prac-
tical.10 Nevertheless, Section 5 makes significant progress toward an understanding
of (4.2) by restricting attention to the case where principals have linear preferences.
10Remarkably, under intrinsic common agency, α(θ) ≡ N , and the necessary condition above can
be shown under mild conditions to also be a sufficient condition for equilibrium. (See Martimort
and Stole, 2011.)
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Definition 4 For any solution (q, U) to program (Pi), an adjoint function M i that
satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 is said to support (q, U).
We can build upon Theorem 1 to discern more properties about the adjoint functions
M i which support (q, U).
Proposition 1 For any optimal solution (q, U) to program (Pi), there exists an
adjoint function M i : Θ→ [0, 1] which supports (q, U) with the following properties:
(i). M i is constant over any connected interval of Θi;
(ii). if Si : Q → R is differentiable and concave, then over any open interval of Θci
for which q−i(·) is strictly decreasing,
(4.3) M i(θ) = F (θ)− S ′i(q−i(θ))f(θ);
(iii). M i is continuous on (θ, θ).
Remarks:
• The constancy of M i on intervals of Θi is implied by the complementary slackness
condition (3.1). Equation (4.3) is a local marginal condition for satisfying (3.2); it
is a necessary condition if Si is concave. The continuity of the adjoint function M i
follows from manipulating (3.1) and (3.2) and the fact that the agent’s reservation
utility, U−i, is a convex function of θ.
• If we conjecture that the equilibrium allocation is strictly decreasing, Proposition 1
implies that each M i is completely characterized once α is known. If we also believe
that each principal’s activity set is a single interval of Θ, then constructing such an
equilibrium is as simple as searching for the endpoints of each principal’s activity
set and checking that the resulting M i constructions from Proposition 1 satisfy the
optimality conditions with respect to (q, U) in Theorem 1.
For any equilibrium allocation function, denote the set of equilibrium actions by
Q ≡ {q ∈ Q | ∃θ ∈ Θ, q = q(θ)}.
Definition 5 Characteristics of an allocation, q:
• An allocation is continuous if q : Θ→ Q is continuous;
• An allocation is separating if q is non-constant and strictly decreasing for all
θ for which q(θ) ∈ int(Q).
Remarks: Continuous allocations may fail to be separating if there are interior
bunching points. Such a possibility is not pathological and arises, for example, when
S0 is strictly concave but not everywhere differentiable.
11 Separating allocations may
also fail to be continuous; discontinuities arise, for example, if all benefit functions
S0, S1, . . . , Sn are linear in q and the solution is of a “bang-bang” nature.
12
11S0 can be strictly concave but non-differentiable in very reasonable settings. For example, if the
agent is producing a public good and S0 is a cost-minimizing mixture of two cost functions, each
with a fixed component and a strictly convex and differentiable variable-cost component, then S0
will be strictly concave and exhibit a kink.
12 The definition of separating equilibrium is weaker than the requirement that q is strictly de-
creasing; a separating allocation may exhibit bunching on the boundaries of Q as long as there is
minimal separation.
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4.2. Continuous equilibrium allocations
Strict concavity of the agent’s objective function (benefit function plus transfers) is
the key condition for continuity as shown below. Note that this condition does not
require that transfer or benefit functions be differentiable.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium allocation, q : Θ → Q, is continuous if and only
if for any i ∈ N the function Wi ≡ S0(q) + Si(q) + T−i(q) is strictly concave or
(equivalently) S0 + T is strictly concave:
q ∈ C0(Θ) ⇐⇒ Wi, strictly concave in Q ⇐⇒ S0 + T , strictly concave in Q,
where C0(Θ) denotes the space of continuous functions on Θ. In any equilibrium
in which q is continuous at an interior boundary of principal i’s activity set, i.e.,
θˆi ∈ (θ, θ), the following properties hold:
(4.4) U(θˆi) = U−i(θˆi) and U˙(θˆi) = U˙−i(θˆi) = −q(θˆi).
Conditions (4.4) are “smooth-pasting” conditions that apply to the agent’s equilib-
rium payoff on the boundary of an activity set which is interior to the type set. From
an economic point of view, these properties require that whenever a principal starts
to be active at an interior point, he does so by changing only marginally the agent’s
decision.
4.3. Separating equilibrium allocations
Proposition 3 Assume that the benefit functions S0, S1, . . . , Sn are continuously
differentiable. If q is a separating equilibrium allocation, then for each i ∈ N , the
transfer function ti is differentiable over int(Q). Furthermore, for the corresponding
activity map α and adjoint functions, {M i, . . . ,Mn},
(4.5) S ′0(q(θ)) + T
′
(q(θ)) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ, q(θ) ∈ intQ,
(4.6) t
′
i(q(θ)) = S
′
i(q(θ)) +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
, a.e. θ ∈ Θ, q(θ) ∈ intQ, i ∈ α(θ),
(4.7) S ′0(q(θ)) +
∑
j∈α(θ)
{
S ′j(q(θ)) +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
}
= θ a.e. θ ∈ Θ.
The economics behind these results is straightforward and reduces to understand-
ing how the standard rent-efficiency trade-off of the screening literature is modified
in a competitive screening environment. Intuitively, when an agent with type θ be-
haves like a less (resp. more) efficient type θ + dθ (resp. θ − dθ), he produces the
same amount at a lower (resp. higher) cost. Mitigating these incentives require the
principals to distort output downwards for all types except the most (resp. least) ef-
ficient one. Those “incentive” distortions are captured by the usual hazard rate term
F (θ)/f(θ) (resp. F (θ)−1/f(θ)) that discounts each principal’s marginal contribution
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below (resp. above) his marginal valuation. Because the type-dependent participa-
tion constraints that are specific to the delegated agency game limit the ability of any
principal to extract rent and reduce outputs, other “participation” distortions must
now be taken into account. Those distortions increase marginal contributions on any
activity sets. They are captured by the new non-negative term M i(θ)/f(θ).
When the measure µi does not put too much mass on types less than θ, we have
M i(θ) < F (θ). This corresponds to the case where principal i finds it relatively cheap
to buy types below θ. The driving force behind output distortions are then the incen-
tive distortions which tend to reduce output and principal i’s marginal contribution.
When instead µi puts enough mass on types lower than θ, i.e., principal i finds it too
costly to induce participation from those types less than θ and prefers to stay inactive.
We have M i(θ) > F (θ) and output distortions are mitigated to ensure participation.
The distortions induced by active principals are compounded altogether at equilib-
rium as it can be shown on Equation (4.7). Importantly, not all distortions may go in
the same direction. This will be illustrated by means of examples in Section 5 below.
Proposition 4 Assume that the benefit functions S0, S1, . . . , Sn are continuously
differentiable. If q is a separating equilibrium allocation, then for each i ∈ N , the
transfer function ti satisfies the following conditions at any interior boundary of prin-
cipal i’s activity set θˆi ∈ (θ, θ) such that q(θˆi) ∈ int(Q)
(4.8) ti(q(θˆi)) = t
′
i(q(θˆi)) = 0.
The “smooth-pasting” conditions (4.8) follow up on (4.4). They imply that principal
i’s non-negative transfer function is locally convex around any point qi(θˆi) which is
in the interior of the range of equilibrium outputs.
5. GAMES WITH LINEAR PREFERENCES
5.1. Equilibria
Although Proposition 3 describes equilibrium outputs, it says little on who the active
principals are on a given set of types. To do so, we first need to describe the adjoint
functions M i. This would generally be a daunting task because the condition (4.3)
depends on q−i which is itself an equilibrium construction. Luckily, sharp predictions
can be achieved when principals have linear preferences since those adjoints take
simple expressions.
Assume that principals’ benefit functions are linear: Si(q) = siq, si 6= 0. We
partition principals into two sets, A = {i ∈ N | si > 0} and B = N \ A. Principals
in A like the agent’s action whereas those in B dislike it. For i ∈ A, define θˆi as the
unique value such that F (θˆi)−sif(θˆi) = 0, if it exists, and θˆi = θ otherwise. Similarly,
for i ∈ B, define θˆi as the unique value such that F (θˆi)− sif(θˆi) = 1, if it exists, and
θˆi = θ otherwise.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Si(q) = siq for i ∈ N . The following adjoint-function profile
supports any non-degenerate equilibrium allocation, q:
M i(θ) = max{F (θ)− sif(θ), 0}, i ∈ A, and M i(θ) = min{F (θ)− sif(θ), 1}, i ∈ B.
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It is now useful to define the following “virtual” marginal valuations of the principals
and their corresponding aggregate
βi(θ) = max
{
si − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
, i ∈ A, βi(θ) = min
{
si +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
, i ∈ B,
β(θ) ≡
∑
i∈N
βi(θ) =
∑
i∈A
max
{
si − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
+
∑
i∈B
min
{
si +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
.
Note that β is continuous and weakly decreasing under our assumption on the gener-
alized monotonicity of the hazard rate.
Lemma 2, in tandem with the necessary condition (4.1) in Theorem 2, allows us to
state a remarkably simple necessary condition for any equilibrium allocation and to
provide sufficient condition.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Si(q) = siq for i ∈ N and that S0 is concave. If q is an
equilibrium allocation with range Q = q(Θ), then for almost every θ ∈ Θ,
(5.1) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + (β(θ)− θ)q.
Moreover, if for all θ ∈ Θ
(5.2) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + (β(θ)− θ)q,
then q is an equilibrium allocation. Such an equilibrium allocation always exists.
The strength of Theorem 3 comes from the fact that (5.1) and (5.2) provide clear
characterizations of equilibrium allocations. In comparison with condition (4.1), this
is a tremendous simplification: any endogenous variables related to activity sets and
equilibrium transfers have now disappeared.
The difference between conditions (5.1) and (5.2) are subtle, but significant. Condi-
tion (5.1) restricts optimality over the set of equilibrium actions, Q, and thus gaps are
a priori possible in the range of q.13 The condition in (5.2) is stronger than (5.1) since
it requires optimality over the whole set of possible actions, Q. When, for instance, S0
is strictly concave, this restriction, which is akin to an equilibrium refinement, impies
that q is indeed continuous. We show below that the benefit of such restriction is that
it allows one to easily reconstruct equilibrium transfers.
To better understand the implications of those findings, we now give more detailed
implications of Theorem 3.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Si(q) = siq for i ∈ N and that S0 is concave.
13The description of the equilibria above bears strong similarities with the literature on mechanism
design without transfers in monopolistic screening environments. See Holmstro¨m (1984), Melumad
and Shibano (1991), Alonso and Matoushek (2008), and Martimort and Semenov (2006) among
others. Everything happens as if the equilibrium output q and its range Q were chosen by a surrogate
principal who aggregates the behavior of all principals and maximizes their aggregate virtual surplus
as in (5.1).
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1. At any point θ where q and S0(q) are both differentiable (resp. in θ and q), we
have
(5.3) q˙(θ) (S ′0(q(θ)) + β(θ)− θ) = 0.
2. At any point θ where q(θ) is discontinuous, we have
(5.4)
[
S0(q) + (β(θ)− θ)q
]q(θ−)
q(θ+)
= 0.
Moreover, the allocation q(θ) exhibits bunching on both the right and left-neighborhoods
of such θ.
When q is strictly decreasing and continuous, it can be readily identified with
the modified Lindahl-Samuelson output qLS. That allocation satisfies the follow-
ing Lindahl-Samuelson conditions except that it applies to the principals’ “virtual”
marginal valuations to account for informational problems:
(5.5) S ′0(q
LS(θ)) +
∑
i∈A
max
{
si − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
+
∑
i∈B
min
{
si +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
= θ.
On the other hand, discontinuities of q, if any, have a very simple structure. Across
any such discontinuity the aggregate virtual surplus of principals remains constant as
shown in (5.4).
In the sequel, we first focus on equilibria that satisfy (5.3), the so-called virtually-
truthful equilibria (Section 5.2). We then describe how those equilibria can be modified
to support discontinuities (Section 5.3).
5.2. Virtually-truthful equilibria
Equilibria which satisfy (5.2) have an appealing property that each principal offers
her “virtual” marginal valuation for the agent’s marginal action. As we will demon-
strate, as the agent’s private information becomes less heterogeneous, such equilibria
converge in a strong sense to the truthful equilibria of the complete-information menu
auction game in Bernheim and Whinston (1986). Viewed in this light, the equilibria
satisfying (5.2) are a generalization of truthful equilibria to the case of incomplete
information, and we thus refer to them henceforth as virtually-truthful allocations:
Definition 6 An allocation is virtually truthful if it satisfies (5.2) for every
θ ∈ Θ.
To make the previous remarks precise, recall from Bernheim and Whinston (1986)
that “truthful” schedules in the complete information game with linear surplus func-
tions correspond to schedules in the form of ti(q) = max{0, siq − Ci} where the con-
stant Ci is principal i’s equilibrium payoff.
14 Such truthful schemes make the agent a
residual claimant for the choice of the decision. Remarkably, Bernheim and Whinston
14 Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Lebreton and Laussel (2001) show that those constants
might not necessarily be unique.
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(1986) demonstrated that truthful equilibria always exist and that they exhibit no
equilibrium inefficiencies (e.g., no problems with free riding, etc.).
In the present setting of incomplete information, the equilibrium schedules which
give rise to an allocation satisfying (5.2) are not truthful. To characterize these
schedules, we need to define an inverse correspondence for the equilibrium allocation
q. To this end, define respectively the corresponding value function V : Θ → R and
its dual conjugate15 V ∗ : Q → R as
V (θ) ≡ max
q∈Q
(β(θ)− θ) q + S0(q) and V ∗(q) ≡ max
θ∈Θ
(β(θ)− θ) q − V (θ).
Note that V ∗ is convex and therefore the subdifferential ∂V ∗(q) is a non-decreasing
correspondence mapping from Q onto Θ. Moreover, q(θ) satisfies (5.2) if and only
if16 q(θ) ∈ ∂V (θ) or, equivalently, θ ∈ ∂V ∗(q(θ)). Because ∂V ∗(q) is single-valued at
almost every q ∈ Q, we will abuse notation slightly and equate the subdifferential with
its subgradient at all such points and denote this subgradient by the more evocative
notation ϑ(q) ≡ ∂V ∗(q). In this sense, ϑ(q) can be viewed as the inverse mapping of
the allocation q(θ).
With this notation, we can construct the following marginal transfer functions for
all q ∈ Q at which ϑ is single-valued:
t
′
i(q) = max
{
si − F (ϑ(q))
f(ϑ(q))
, 0
}
, i ∈ A, and t′i(q) = min
{
si +
1− F (ϑ(q))
f(ϑ(q))
, 0
}
, i ∈ B.
Because marginal transfers are continuous for a.e. q ∈ Q, we can integrate these
expressions and recover the equilibrium schedule ti up to some constants
(5.6) ti(q) = Ci +
∫ q
q(θˆi)
max
{
si − F (ϑ(q))
f(ϑ(q))
, 0
}
dq, i ∈ A,
(5.7) ti(q) = Ci +
∫ q
q(θˆi)
min
{
si +
1− F (ϑ(q))
f(ϑ(q))
, 0
}
dq, i ∈ B
where θˆi is defined as above. Principals for i ∈ A are active on all [θ, θˆi) whereas
principals for i ∈ B are so on all (θˆi, θ].
These schedules are strictly convex over their positive range because ϑ is nonin-
creasing and the hazard rates are monotonic.17 Moreover, when θˆi is interior, we have
ti(q(θˆi)) = 0 and the constant Ci is zero. These schedules are therefore smooth at
such points with a zero derivative t
′
i(q(θˆi)) = 0. These “smooth-pasting” and con-
vexity properties stand in contrast with truthful schedules which exhibit kinks and
are only linear over their positive range. The intuition for those differences is that,
under asymmetric information, the equilibrium schedule is much more constrained
around any point. Indeed, such a schedule now has to go through equilibrium points
corresponding to nearby types. This “extra information” implies smooth-pasting.
15Appendix A recaps tools from convex analysis that are helpful to understand this construction.
16See Lemma 5 in Appendix B.
17See the proof of Proposition 9 below for details.
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We now return to our earlier claim that these virtually-truthful schedules in the
incomplete-information game converge in a sense to the truthful schedules of Bern-
heim and Whinston (1986) in the complete-information game. For any allocation
q which satisfies (5.2) everywhere on Θ, consider the equilibrium schedule for some
principal i, which we take to be i ∈ A without loss of generality. For any absolutely
continuous distribution of θ satisfying the monotone-hazard rate property, we have
already demonstrated that the unique equilibrium marginal transfer for principal i is
given by
t
′
i(q(θ)) = max
{
si − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
.
Consider a class of absolutely-continuous distributions of θ in which each distribution
has the same mean and each satisfies the generalized monotone-hazard rate property.
Suppose that this class of distributions is second-order stochastically ordered, and
let κ ∈ [0,∞) be an index representing a mean-preserving contraction of F around
the common mean. An arbitrary distribution in this class is denoted F (θ, κ) and
limκ→∞ F (θ, κ) is a Dirac distribution centered on the common mean. Using our
previous construction of marginal transfers, we may thus write principal i’s marginal
transfer for a given distribution κ as
τ i(θ, κ) ≡ max
{
si − F (θ, κ)
f(θ, κ)
, 0
}
.
The following proposition makes precise the sense in which equilibria satisfying (5.2)
are a generalization of truthful equilibria to the case of incomplete information.
Proposition 6 The expected marginal transfer of principal i in the complete-information
limit game is principal i’s marginal benefit:
(5.8) lim
κ→∞
∫
Θ
τ i(θ, κ)f(θ, κ)dθ = si.
To conclude this section, we provide a complete characterization of virtually-truthful
equilibria for games with linear preferences. We will apply this result in Section 6 to
a few economic applications to illustrate the value of our framework.
Proposition 7 Suppose that Si(q) = siq for i ∈ N .
1. If S0 : Q → R is linear, then there exists a type, θˆ ∈ [θ, θ], such that every
virtually-truthful equilibrium allocation satisfies
(5.9) q(θ) =
{
qmax θ < θˆ
qmin θ > θˆ.
2. If S0 : Q → R is strictly concave, then a unique virtually-truthful equilibrium
allocation exists and it is continuous.
3. If S0 : Q → R is strictly concave and differentiable, then a unique virtually-
truthful equilibrium allocation exists and it is both continuous and separating.
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5.3. Discontinuous equilibria
Turning now to the analysis of discontinuous equilibria, we specialize our model to
the case of two principals.
Proposition 8 Suppose that Si(q) = siq for i ∈ N = {1, 2} and S0 : Q → R is
strictly concave and differentiable. Then, for any virtually-truthful equilibrium q(θ)
and any θ0 where both principals are active in that equilibrium, one can construct
nearby equilibria exhibiting a discontinuity at θ0 (i.e., q
d(θ+0 ) < q
d(θ−0 )).
To sustain those equilibria, principals design their contracts with “non-serious” out-
of-equilibrium offers. For instance, principal 2 stipulates non-negative payments for
outputs within the discontinuity gap [qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )] which are such that principal 1
is just indifferent to inducing the agent with type θ0 to produce any output within
that range. This makes it possible to sustain the discontinuity in the agent’s choice.18
6. APPLICATIONS
6.1. Voluntary provision of a public good
In such setting, all principals/contributors have congruent objectives and enjoy more
of the public good being produced. To illustrate the richness of equilibrium patterns
compatible with Proposition 7, we nevertheless distinguish two cases.
6.1.1. Public goods game in which S0 is strictly concave.
Consider the public goods game with n principals ordered from s1 ≥ ... ≥ sn > 0
(i ∈ N = {1, .., n}), and assume that S0(q) = −12q2 so that there are decreasing
returns to scale. We also assume that Q = [0, qmax] with qmax sufficiently large (e.g.,
qmax ≥ −θ +
∑
i∈N si) and Θ = [0, θ¯].
Proposition 9 In the public goods game with decreasing returns to scale S0(q) =
−1
2
q2, the virtually-truthful equilibrium allocation is
(6.1) q(θ) = max
{∑
i∈N
max
{
si − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
− θ, 0
}
.
Example: For N = {1, 2}, the efficient output is qFB(θ) = max{s1 + s2 − θ, 0}
whereas the optimal output that principal 1 would implement if he was alone to
contract with the agent is q∗1(θ) = max{s1− θ− F (θ)f(θ) , 0}. It entails only one screening
distortion. The equilibrium output of the delegated agency game exhibits two such
screening distortions when principal 2 finds it also worth to intervene:
q(θ) = max
{
s1 + s2 − θ − 2F (θ)
f(θ)
, s1 − θ − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
,
This example nicely illustrates two sources of inefficiency in delegated common
agency games. First, there are the usual extra two-fold incentive distortion that
18The above construction could be replicated to sustain equilibria with multiple discontinuities.
18 D. MARTIMORT, L. STOLE
already arises in intrinsic common agency games.19 Second, another distortion comes
from limited participation; which can be interpreted as an extreme form of free-
riding. Indeed, it is straightforward to observe that there exists an non-empty interval
for θ such that s2 ≤ F (θ)f(θ) ≤ s1 where only principal 1 is active under asymmetric
information. Under complete information, instead, both principals would be active
on that interval.
Another interpretation of such limited participation is that, under asymmetric in-
formation, exclusive contracting can emerge endogenously even if exclusivity clause
cannot be enforced. This is so even if, under complete information, both principals
would like to contract with the agent.20
s1   F ( )f( )
q¯( )
✓
qFB( )
s1 + s2   2F ( )f( )
0
q
Figure 1: Voluntary provision of a public good.
6.1.2. Public goods game with linear payoffs q ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose now that Q = [0, 1] and S0(q) = 0, i.e., the agent ha not value for the
good. For simplicity, assume that
∑
i∈N si ≥ θ (i.e., the first best has some public
good provision) and that, for each principal i, there is a unique solution, θˆi, satisfying
F (θˆi) − sif(θˆi) = 0. The latter implies θ ≥ θˆ1 ≥ · · · ≥ θˆn ≥ θ. Applying Theorem
3, the set of virtually-truthful allocations is the solution set to (5.2). Under our
simplifying assumptions, there is a unique θˆ such that
∑
i∈N
max
{
si − F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
, 0
}
= θˆ.
The following conclusion follows largely from the results in Section 5.
19See Martimort and Stole (2011).
20 This finding is reminiscent of the insights developed by Bernheim and Whinston (1998) in an
I.O. context. Those authors showed that exclusive dealing in marketing practices arises when the
agency costs of a common representation are too large compared with those under an exclusive
representation even though under complete information, common agency is at least always weakly
optimal. In our context, those agency costs are due to the agent’s private information and not to
hidden actions.
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Proposition 10 In the public goods game with linear preferences, a virtually-truthful
equilibrium allocation satisfies
(6.2) q(θ) =
{
1 θ < θˆ
0 θ > θˆ.
Virtually-truthful schedules are linear in q
(6.3) ti(q) = max
{
si − F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
, 0
}
q, q ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N.21
6.2. Influence and Lobbying Games
Consider now two competing interest groups having instead conflicting preferences
S1(q) = −S2(q) = q. For instance, principal 1 enjoys higher tax rates q whereas
principal 2 prefers lower tax rates. The decision-maker (agent) has some ideal policy
he would like to pursue in the absence of any influence by lobbying groups. To model
these intrinsic preferences, let assume that S0(q) = − q22 where q ∈ Q = [−qmax, qmax]
with qmax being large enough to ensure interior solutions. Assume also that the
agent’s ideal point q0(θ) = −θ is symmetrically distributed over [−δ, δ] with δ < 1.22
Choosing this bliss point gives a status quo payoff U0(θ) =
θ2
2
to the agent.23
Segmented markets for influence. Still relying on the general methodology
developed in Theorem 3 and Proposition 7, we obtain:
Proposition 11 The virtually-truthful equilibrium allocation of the lobbying game
for s1 > 0 > s2 is
(6.4) q(θ) = max
{
s1 − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
+ min
{
s2 +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
− θ.
If θ is uniformly distributed, the activity sets of the principals are
(6.5) Θ1 = [−δ,min{s1 − δ, δ}) and Θ2 = (max{δ + s2,−δ}, δ].
If type heterogeneity is small relative to the strength of the principals’ preferences,
δ <
s1 + |s2|
2
,
then the principals commonly influence a positive measure of intermediate-type agents;
otherwise, each principal has a separate domain of influence.
21 Similar models have been studied by Martimort (1996) and Lebreton and Salanie´ (2003). These
papers have principals (regulatory bodies in Martimort (1996) and lobbying groups in Lebreton
and Salanie´ (2003)) competing with single transfers –a positive payment if and only if the agent
implements the decision they prefer – in a context where the choice of policy is binary. Proposition
10 highlights conditions under which similar results also hold when policy choices are continuous and
no restriction is a priori imposed on contribution schedules.
22 Since principals are symmetrically biased in opposite directions, they would just agree on letting
the agent choose his status quo policy had they cooperated.
23We could mirror the analysis in Section 6.1.2 and entertain the possibility that competing interest
groups are opposed on whether to undertake a discrete policy (allowing free trade or not, allowing
some drugs or not, etc...). We leave to the reader to develop such straightforward extension.
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The transfers which implement this equilibrium allocation can be found by inverting
q(θ) and substituting this expression for ϑ(q) into (5.6)-(5.7). The lobbying model
shows that only decision-makers with mild preferences receive contributions from both
interest groups. Unchallenged influence only arises endogenously for the decision-
makers who are the most “ideologically” oriented.24
q
    
3(1  )
 3(1  )
1    1
q(✓) =  3✓
q(✓) =     1  2✓
q(✓) = 1      2✓
✓
qFB(✓)
Figure 2: Virtually-truthful equilibrium allocation in a symmetric lobbying game,
s1 =−s2 = 1, with δ ∈ (12 , 1). Common influence arises for types θ ∈ (δ − 1, 1− δ).
Discontinuous equilibria in the lobbying game. In that specific lobbying
context, we can establish a version of Proposition 8. Taking a uniform and symmetric
distribution around zero, we modify the “virtually-truthful” allocation by introducing
a discontinuity at zero and provide an upper bound on how strong this discontinuity
can be.
Proposition 12 Suppose that s1 = −s2 = 1 and S0(q) = − q22 and that θ is uni-
formly distributed on Θ = [−δ, δ] with δ < 1
2
. There exists a continuum of equi-
libria with a discontinuity at θ0 = 0 and such that q
d(θ−0 ) = −qd(θ+0 ) = q0 and
24Martimort and Semenov (2008) derive further results on the patterns of contributions in a
lobbying game. That latter paper did not derive the continuity of equilibrium output as we do here
and focused on slightly different objective functions.
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q0 ∈ (0, (1− δ)
√
3]. The corresponding allocation is then
(6.6) qd(θ) =

q(θ) for θ ∈ [−δ,−q0/3]
⋃
[q0/3, δ],
q0 for θ ∈ [−q0/3, 0),
−q0 for θ ∈ (0, q0/3].
Aggregate welfare in those discontinuous equilibria is lower than the “virtually-truthful”
allocation q(θ) = −3θ.
A competitive nonlinear pricing reinterpretation. Interestingly, the lob-
bying model of this section can be transposed mutatis mutandis in an I.O. context to
study how a consumer having private information on his most preferred bundle mixes
between two goods marketed by two competing sellers. Suppose that this consumer
wants to acquire one unit of an homogenous good and is located at a point θ ∈ [0, 1]
on a unit line, one seller being located at each extreme. The consumer has a valuation
v for the good and incurs a quadratic transportation cost −1
2
(q − θ)2 when moving
away from his “ideal mix” where he consumes q0(θ) = θ from principal 1 and 1−q0(θ)
from principal 2. Up to some normalizations, the consumer and the sellers’ profits
are similar to those of the lobbying model above when the marginal cost is the same
for both sellers and equal to one. Our previous results can be reinterpreted as giving
conditions under which a share of the market is always covered by both sellers. Un-
less exclusivity is exogenously imposed, mixed bundling arises and market-sharing by
means of exclusive contracts cannot be an equilibrium. Hoernig and Valletti (2010)
have independently derived a similar insight but, at the outset, restricted their anal-
ysis to smooth tariffs. In particular, their analysis does not allow for discontinuous
tariff; a restriction which may be justified by the fact that aggregate welfare is greater
with the virtually-truthful and continuous allocation they focus on.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a methodology for solving public delegated common
agency games under asymmetric information. In a nutshell, the basic economic in-
sights of this research is that the well-known rent-efficiency trade-off must now signif-
icantly be modified to account for the impact of competition among principals. First,
the compounded output distortions that arise at equilibrium reflect whether princi-
pals have conflicting or congruent objectives. Moreover, those distortions can all be
captured by observing that an equilibrium allocation must maximize the “virtual ag-
gregate” surplus of principals which may lead to simple modified Lindahl-Samuelson
conditions. Second, contributions for some equilibria are no longer truthful but in-
stead “virtually truthful” to account for the agency costs that each principals incur.
Third, a rich pattern of activity sets that reflects the congruence or conflict between
principals may emerge at equilibrium and we illustrated those facts by means of ex-
amples.
Other specific settings of economic interest (trade, regulation, multi-unit auctions,
common representation on retailer markets, etc...) that have already been deeply stud-
ied by means of the common agency methodology in a world of complete information
would benefit from a serious consideration of agency problems using our methodol-
ogy. Inefficient representations of interest groups in trade negotiations, endogenous
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limited entry in auction contexts, exclusive dealing agreements on retailing markets
are, among others, interesting and important economic issues that can be explained
by a careful study of the activity sets of some principals in specific contexts.
Beyond, our paper also suggests a few alleys for more theoretical works. First, the
techniques developed in this paper might also be useful in private common agency
games as well, i.e., when principals rely on different screening variables to control the
agent. The ultimate objectives of such investigation should be to describe patterns of
market coverage where either exclusive or multiple purchases endogenously arise on
different subset of the type space. Such investigation is particularly important since
students of market competition have generally found hard to reconcile market data
with existing models of competition in nonlinear prices.25
Second, some applied settings may require to develop a framework where principals
share some common screening devices but keep others private. For instance, one
may think of specific games between competing manufacturers dealing with the same
retailers and contracting on some commonly observed price downstream but keeping
their sales of intermediary goods secret. These settings lie somewhere in between
the case of public delegated agency games and the case of private agency games.
Extending our methodology to semi-public environments may be important.
We plan to investigate such extensions in future research.
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS OF MAIN RESULTS
7.1. Preliminaries
For completeness, we review a few definitions and facts from convex analysis, spe-
cializing them for our present purposes in Lemmas 3-6. The reader familiar with
convex analysis may wish to skip to Section 7.2. We make repeated references to the
volume by Rockafellar and Wets (2004) (hereafter RW). Equipped with Lemmas 3-6,
we shall more efficiently prove the results presented in the main text.
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Let W : Q → R be any finite-valued, upper semi-continuous function defined over
a compact domain. For any σ ∈ R, the value function V : R→ R
V (σ) ≡ max
q∈Q
W (q) + σq
is well defined. Because it is the pointwise maximum of a family of affine functions, it
is a convex, proper, and lower semi-continuous (RW, 8.13.). Given our assumptions
on boundedness and compactness, for any σ ∈ R, V (σ) is finite-valued (and hence
proper with effective domain R). It follows that V is a continuous function on R.
Because V is a proper convex function, for any point in its domain we can define
its subdifferential
∂V (σ) ≡ {y ∈ R |V (s) ≥ V (σ) + y(s− σ) for all s} .26
Because V is a proper, convex function, the left and right derivatives V ′+(σ) and V
′
−(σ)
exist and satisfy V ′+(σ) ≥ V ′−(σ), and the subdifferential has the simple representation
(RW, 8.52):
∂V (σ) =
{
y ∈ R |V ′+(σ) ≥ y ≥ V ′−(σ)
}
.
Subdifferentials of convex functions have several other important properties:
Lemma 3 Let V : R → R be a proper, convex function and ∂V : R → R its
subdifferential:
• ∂V is monotone (RW, 12.1, 12.17), i.e.,
(x0 − x1)(y0 − y1) ≥ 0 whenever y0 ∈ ∂V (x0), y1 ∈ ∂V (x1).
Furthermore, V is strictly convex on its domain if and only if ∂V is strictly
monotone:
(x0 − x1)(y0 − y1) > 0 whenever y0 ∈ ∂V (x0), y1 ∈ ∂V (x1).
• The graph of ∂V is closed and convex valued (RW, 12.8).
• ∂V is almost everywhere single-valued and differentiable, i.e., V is a.e. twice
differentiable, (RW-12.66).
• ∂V is continuous at any point σ where it is single-valued ∂V (σ) = {V ′(σ)}
(RW-12.63).
Define the dual conjugate27 of V as the value of the dual program
V ∗(q) ≡ max
σ∈R
σq − V (σ).
Here V ∗ : R → R ∪ {∞} is a possibly extended-valued function (i.e., its effective
domain may be a strict subset of R). Nonetheless, like the value function V , conju-
gates are necessarily proper, convex, lower semi-continuous functions, and they are
26When V is a proper concave function, for any point in its domain we can define its superdif-
ferential
∂∗V (σ) ≡ {y ∈ R |V (s) ≤ V (σ) + y · (s− σ) for all s} .
Of course ∂∗V = −∂(−V ).
27This is also known as the Legendre-Fenchel transform.
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continuous on their domains. As such, the subdifferential of V ∗ exists and has the
properties listed in Lemma 3. Also note that by construction, −V ∗(q) ≥ W (q) for all
q ∈ Q.
We now illustrate some of the important duality properties of V , V ∗ and their
subdifferentials. First, the subdifferential allows us to generalize Fermat’s first-order
rule. If q ∈ arg maxq∈Q W (q) + σq, it follows that q ∈ ∂V (σ). (RW, 10.1.) If
q ∈ ∂V (σ), it follows that q ∈ arg maxq∈R−V ∗(q) + σq, and hence
−V ∗(q) + σq ≥ W (q) + σq, ∀ q ∈ R.
Hence, if q ∈ V (σ) and q ∈ Q, then q is also a solution to the primal program
maxq∈QW (q) + σq. We have the following statement of these facts.
Lemma 4 For all σ ∈ R,
∂V (σ) ∩Q ⊆ arg max
q∈Q
W (q) + σq ⊆ ∂V (σ).
Second, there is a useful connection between the subdifferential correspondences of
the conjugate pair, V and V ∗.
Lemma 5 (RW, 11.3)
• Each subdifferential is the inverse correspondence of the other: ∂V ∗ = (∂V )−1, ∂V =
(∂V ∗)−1. Indeed,
(A1) q ∈ ∂V (σ) ⇐⇒ σ ∈ ∂V ∗(q) ⇐⇒ V (σ) + V ∗(q) = σq,
whereas V (σ) + V ∗(q) ≥ qσ for all (q, σ) ∈ R2 (Fenchel’s inequality).
• Moreover,
(A2) ∂V (σ) = arg max
q∈R
qσ − V ∗(q), ∂V ∗(q) = arg max
σ∈R
qσ − V (σ).
In what follows, we will say that any (q, σ) which satisfies q ∈ ∂V (σ) (or the
equivalent conditions in (A1)) is a dual pair.
One final property that we will exploit below is the duality between the differentia-
bility of one value function and the strict convexity of its conjugate pair.
Lemma 6 (RW, 11.8, 11.13.) For any proper, lower semi-continuous, convex func-
tion V and its conjugate V ∗,
∂V (σ) = {q} ⇐⇒ V ∗(q) differentiable,
∂V ∗(q) = {σ} ⇐⇒ V (σ) differentiable.
Moreover, ∂V (σ) (respectively, ∂V ∗) is single-valued at q if and only if V (respectively,
V ∗) is locally strictly convex.
In the proof of the theorems from the main text, we will make heavy use of Lemmas
5 and 6, applied to two different choices of W . When W ≡ S0 + ti + T−i, we define
the agent’s value function, its dual conjugate and its dual argument respectively as
(A3) V0(σ) ≡ max
q∈Q
S0(q) + ti(q) + T−i(q) + σq,
PUBLIC CONTRACTING GAMES 27
(A4) V ∗0 (q) ≡ max
σ∈R
σq − V0(σ),
(A5) σ0(θ) ≡ −θ.
Those quantities will allow us to describe the agent’s optimal behavior. Alternatively,
to describe principal i’s optimal behavior, we apply the previous definitions and Lem-
mas for the case where W ≡ Wi ≡ S0 + Si + T−i. The value function Vi and its
conjugate V ∗i then become
(A6) Vi(σ) ≡ max
q∈Q
S0(q) + Si(q) + T−i(q) + σq,
(A7) V ∗i (q) ≡ max
σ∈R
σq − Vi(σ)
In this case, we may define the associated dual variable defined as
(A8) σi(θ) ≡ M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ.
where M i(θ) is a non-decreasing left-continuous function.
7.2. Proofs of statements in the main text
Proof of Lemma 1: Necessity: Because ti ≥ 0, U(θ) ≥ U−i(θ). By definition,
U(θ) = V0(−θ) and hence it is convex from Lemma 4. Moreover, −q(θ) ∈ ∂U(θ).
Sufficiency: Given that U(θ) ≥ U−i(θ), the offer is acceptable. U is convex, de-
creasing, and it is supported by −q(θ) at each θ ∈ Θ. Given that q(θ) has domain Q,
Lemma 4 implies that q(θ) is optimal for the agent. Hence, (q, U) is implementable.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: Step 1: The relaxed program. Consider the relaxed
program, (Pri ), that ignores the convexity constraint (2.3):
(Pri ) : max
(U∈AC,q∈QΘ)
∫
Θ
(
Si(q(θ)) + S0(q(θ)) +
∑
j 6=i
tj(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ
subject to (2.1), (2.2).
We apply Theorem B.1 (which is stated and proved in Appendix B) and conclude
that for any given profile of transfers t−i offered by rival principals the rent-output
profile (U, q) is a solution to (Pri ) if and only if (U, q) satisfies (2.1), (2.2) and there
exists a probability measure µi defined over the Borel subsets of Θ with an associated
adjoint function, M i : Θ→ [0, 1], defined by M i(θ) = 0 and for θ > θ,
M i(θ) ≡
∫
[θ,θ)
µi(dθ),
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such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(A9) supp {µi} ⊆
{
θ |U(θ) = U−i(θ)
}
,
(A10) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
Si(q) + S0(q) +
∑
j 6=i
tj(q) +
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ
)
q, a.e.
Step 2: Convexity of “relaxed” solution: To demonstrate that the solution
U to the relaxed program is convex it is sufficient to show that there is a non-increasing
selection within the best-response correspondence defined by (A10). If so, the condi-
tions of the “relaxed” Theorem apply to the more constrained program obtained by
appending (2.3) to (2.1) and (2.2).
Define the value function Vi(σ) and σi(θ) as in (A6) and (A8) respectively. On
principal i’s activity set, Θi, derived in the relaxed program, M i is constant for all
connected intervals (by Equation (A9)). By assumption, (F (θ)−κ)/f(θ) is increasing
for any κ ∈ [0, 1], and so σi defined above is strictly decreasing on Θi. Thus for all θ
in any connected subset of Θi, the correspondence ∂Vi(σi(θ)) is monotone decreasing.
(Lemma 3.)
Restating the optimality condition (3.2) in Theorem 1 as
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
Wi(q) + σ(θ)q, a.e.,
with Vi(σ(θ)) = Wi(q(θ)) + σ(θ)q(θ), a.e., we obtain
Lemma 7 Suppose that q is feasible, q(Θ) ⊆ Q, and that W = S0 +Si +T−i. Then
(A11) (3.2) ⇐⇒ q(θ) ∈ ∂V (σ(θ)), a.e. ⇐⇒ σ(θ) ∈ ∂V ∗(q(θ)), a.e.
Thus, any solution to the relaxed program satisfies q(θ) ∈ ∂Vi(σi(θ)) a.e. (Condition
(A11)). Because ∂Vi(σi(θ)) is monotone decreasing in θ, we can find a non-increasing
solution q˜(θ) ∈ ∂Vi(σi(θ)) for every θ ∈ Θi. Hence, one can choose q that solves the
relaxed program, and is non-increasing on Θi.
On any open interval of Θ
c
i , we know that U(θ) = U−i(θ), and thus q(θ) =
q−i(θ), a.e.. Because the latter is non-increasing, we conclude that one can choose q
that solves the relaxed program and is non-increasing on the interior of Θ
c
i .
What remains to be shown is that q is non-increasing at any boundary point of
Θ
c
i . Let θˆ be such a point. Suppose that M i is continuous at θˆ, so σi is also. On
either side of θˆ, our previous argument established that q was non-increasing, and
therefore σi is non-increasing. Thus, ∂Vi(σ(θ)) is monotone decreasing in θ and, from
the first inclusion in (A11), q cannot jump upwards at θˆ. Suppose instead that M i
jumps upwards at θˆ. Because M i is left-continuous and µi can only have an atom
at a point in Θˆci , it follows that the adjoint function must jump upwards from M i(θˆ)
to M i(θˆ
+). For the neighborhood [θˆ, θˆ + ε), U(θ) = U−i(θ). For the neighborhood
(θˆ − ε, θˆ), U(θ) > U−i(θ). Because U−i is convex and minorizes U at θˆ, it must
be that U is locally convex at θˆ. But then Lemma 1 implies that q cannot jump
upwards. It follows that any solution that is non-increasing on Θi and int(Θ
c
i) must
be non-increasing over all Θ. Hence, q is a solution to the relaxed program that is
non-increasing. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Theorem 2: The condition in (3.2) holds for almost every θ ∈ Θ and
for any i ∈ N . Thus, fixing θ, we may add up all maximands in (3.2) for i ∈ α(θ). It
follows that q(θ) also maximizes this aggregate maximand in (4.1) almost everywhere.
We obtain (4.2) by summing only over active principals, expanding terms and noting
that
∑
i∈α(θ)
∑
j∈N\{i} tj(q) = (|α(θ)| − 1)T (q) +
∑
j 6∈α(θ) tj(q), we get:
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q)−θq+
∑
i∈α(θ)
Si(q)+
∑
i 6∈α(θ)
ti(q)+
∑
i∈α(θ)
(
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
+ (|α(θ)| − 1) (S0(q)− θq + T (q)) , a.e.
Because
∑
i 6∈α(θ) ti(q(θ)) = 0 by definition and
∑
i 6∈α(θ) ti(q) ≥ 0, we get the result.
Q.E.D.
To prove Proposition 1, we will need the following Lemma.
Lemma 8 Consider any interval of bunching, [θ0, θ1], over which q(θ) = qˆ and such
that θˆ ∈ [θ0, θ1]
⋂
Θ
c
i . Then, [θ0, θ1] ⊆ Θci .
Proof of Lemma 8: Since θˆ ∈ Θci , U(θˆ) = U−i(θˆ). Because U(θ) ≥ U−i(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θ and U−i is convex, it follows that U must be locally more convex than U−i
around θˆ. But q(θ) = qˆ over [θ0, θ1] implies that U is an affine function on [θ0, θ1] and
so, necessarily U(θ) = U−i(θ) over this whole interval. Finally, [θ0, θ1] ⊆ Θci . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Implication 1: The complementary slackness condition (3.1) in Theorem 1 requires
that µi(θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ Θi. Hence, M i must be constant on any connected interval
of Θi.
Implication 2: Here, we again refer to the value function and dual variable defined in
(A6) and (A8) and the optimality conditions (A11).
Consider now an arbitrary point θˆ ∈ int(Θci) around which q−i is strictly decreas-
ing. By definition, we have U(θˆ) = U−i(θˆ), and thus ∂U(θˆ) = ∂U−i(θˆ) for such θˆ
and one may as well select within those subgradient correspondences q(θˆ) = q−i(θˆ).
Furthermore, incentive compatibility requires that
q(θ) = q−i(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq
for all θ ∈ Θci . Because Si is differentiable and concave,
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
Si(q)− S ′i(q−i(θ))q
for all θ ∈ Θci . Adding these two programs together yields
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + Si(q)− S ′i(q−i(θ))q, ∀θ ∈ Θci .
This is equivalent to the statement
q(θ) = q−i(θ) ∈ ∂Vi(σ0(θ)), ∀θ ∈ Θci ,
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where σ0(θ) ≡ −(θ + S ′i(q−i(θ)). We thus have the joint requirement that
q(θ) ∈ ∂Vi(σ0(θ)) ∩ ∂Vi(σi(θ)), a.e. θ ∈ Θci .
Lemma 5 implies the equivalent statement
σi(θ), σ0(θ) ∈ ∂V ∗i (q−i(θ)), a.e. θ ∈ Θci .
By hypothesis, q−i is strictly decreasing in a neighborhood of θˆ that is contained
in Θ
c
i , and so Lemma 5 also implies that ∂V
∗
i (q−i(θ)) is single valued in the same
neighborhood. Hence, σi(θ) = σ0(θ), a.e. in this neighborhood. This, in turn, can
only be true if M i(θ) = F (θ)−S ′i(q−i(θ))f(θ), a.e. in the neighborhood of θˆ ∈ int(Θci).
Because M i is a non-decreasing function, M i(θ) = F (θ) − S ′i(q−i(θ))f(θ) must hold
for all θ in the open neighborhood of θˆ. This is the second implication.
Implications 1 and 2 of the Proposition must hold for any adjoint function which
supports (q, U). We lastly prove that for any adjoint function that supports (q, U),
there is a continuous adjoint function which does so as well. That is, there may be an
equivalence class of adjoint functions which support (q, U); our continuity statement
is that this class always contains at least one continuous member.
Implication 3: Because M i is constant over Θi, any upward discontinuity point must
lie in Θ
c
i . Because the density f is continuous, M i is upward discontinuous if and only
if the associated construction σi is upward discontinuous.
Consider an arbitrary upward jump at θˆ ∈ Θci ∩ (θ, θ) and recall our construction
of the proper convex value function, Vi, and the requirement of (3.2) that q(θ) ∈
∂Vi(σi(θ)), a.e.. Because Vi is convex, ∂Vi is a monotone correspondence. Because
q(θ) is a non-increasing selection which lies in ∂Vi(σi(θ)) for a.e. θ, σi must be
strictly decreasing over any interval for which q is strictly decreasing. In particular,
σi cannot jump upwards (and hence M i cannot jump upwards) over any region for
which q is strictly decreasing from Lemma 3.
What remains is the possibility that M i jumps upward on an inactive region of
bunching [θ0, θ1]. From Lemma 8, we may as well take [θ0, θ1] as the maximal interval
of bunching over Θci .
Suppose now that a discontinuity point of M i arises at some θˆ which is not an
interior point of [θ0, θ1]. Consider first the case θˆ = θ0. Because we assume that
θˆ ∈ (θ, θ), it must be that θˆ = θ0 > θ. The local convexity of U − U−i implies that
(A12) q(θ−0 ) ≥ qˆ = q−i(θ+0 ) = q(θ+0 ),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that U¯ is convex, the second from the
fact that there is bunching over [θ0, θ0 + ε) for ε > 0 sufficiently small and principal i
is inactive there. Suppose that θ0 is a point of discontinuity of q. Then, (A12) implies
that q must have a downward jump at θ0. But this is a contradiction with the fact
that M i (and therefore σi) has an upward jump at θ0. Hence, q(θ
−
0 ) = q(θ
+
0 ) and q is
continuous at θ0. This in turn implies that that M i is also right-continuous at θ0.
The same kind of arguments eliminates the possibility of an upward jump for M i
at θˆ = θ1 < θ.
Suppose that M˜i supports (q, U) but that it has a discontinuity at an interior point
of a bunching interval [θ0, θ1] ⊆ Θci . We now argue that for any such M˜i, there exists
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a modified M i which is continuous and also supports (q, U). Let M i = M˜i for all θ
except over the interior of bunching regions on which M˜i is discontinuous. Over these
intervals, let M i be a strictly increasing, continuous approximation to M˜i from below.
Such an approximation exists and can be made arbitrarily close to M˜i so as to satisfy
σi([θ0, θ1]) = σ˜i([θ0, θ1]).
Because it is strictly increasing on Θ
c
i , the modified M i satisfies (3.1) in Theorem 1.
Because σ˜i([θ0, θ1]) = ∂V
∗
i (qˆ), we have, as required by (3.2),
σi([θ0, θ1]) = ∂V
∗
i (qˆ).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
First claim: We say that a function f is effectively strictly concave (e.s.c) if its mini-
mal upper concave envelope is strictly concave (or alternatively, if convex biconjugate
(−f)∗∗) is strictly convex). We first prove that the continuity of q is equivalent to the
effective strict concavity of Wi ≡ S0+Si+T−i, i ∈ N and the effective strict concavity
of W0 ≡ S0 + T . To this end, we again refer to the value function and dual variable
defined in (A6) and (A8) and the optimality conditions (A11). By Proposition 1,
M i is continuous. It follows that if q is continuous at θ and q(θ) ∈ ∂Vi(σi(θ)), then
∂Vi(σi(θ)) must be single-valued because it is monotone by Lemma 3.
Lemma 6 establishes that the subdifferential of a convex value function is single-
valued if and only if its conjugate is locally strictly convex, which is equivalent to the
requirement that −V ∗(q) is strictly concave at q = q(θ). This is also equivalent to the
requirement that Wi = S0 +Si+T−i is effectively strictly concave. Such an argument
must be true for all i ∈ N . A similar argument also applies to W0 = S0 + T . Hence,
q ∈ C0(Θ) ⇐⇒ −V ∗i strictly concave on Q ⇐⇒ (U)∗ strictly convex on Q.
Having established the equivalence relationships using the notion of effective strict
concavity, we need only demonstrate that a function which is both effectively strictly
concave and upper semi-continuous must itself be strictly concave. To this end, we
record the following lemma.
Lemma 9 (−f)∗∗ strictly convex, f u.s.c. =⇒ f is strictly concave.
Proof of Lemma 9: By definition epi(−f)∗∗ is the smallest, closed convex set which
contains epi(−f). Because f is u.s.c., the epigraph of −f is also closed. If these sets
are equal, then −f is strictly convex (and f is strictly concave). If these sets are
different, then epi(−f) must be non-convex over some region and therefore epi(−f)∗∗
must have a linear segment over this region. Hence, (−f)∗∗ is not strictly convex (i.e.,
f is not effectively strictly concave) as supposed. Q.E.D.
Second claim: Suppose that q is continuous at θˆi which is on the boundary of principal
i’s activity set Θi and interior (i.e., θˆi ∈ bd Θci
⋂
int(Θ)). At such θˆi we have
U(θˆi) = U−i(θˆi)
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where
U(θˆi) = S0(q(θˆi))− θˆiq(θˆi) + T−i(q(θˆi)) + ti(q(θˆi))
and
U−i(θˆi) = S0(q−i(θˆi))− θˆiq−i(θˆi) + T−i(q−i(θˆi)).
By hypothesis, q is continuous at θˆi which is interior, and so U(θ) is differentiable
at θˆi with, from Lemma 1, a derivative equal to −q(θˆi). Because U is smooth and
minorized by the convex function U−i at θˆi, it follows also that U−i(θ) is itself differ-
entiable at θˆi and (4.4) holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We begin by proving that if q is separating, then each
ti is differentiable on int(Q). To this end, we again refer to the value function and
dual variable defined in (A6) and (A8) and the optimality conditions (A11).
Because q is separating, there exists an interval [θ0, θ1] ⊆ Θ on which q is strictly
decreasing. For all θ in this interval q(θ) = ∂Vi(σi(θ)). Using Lemma 6, this implies
that V ∗i is smooth for all q in the interior of Q. Because Wi ≡ S0 +Si +T−i coincides
with −V ∗i on Q, Wi must also be differentiable on the interior of this set. Because
S0 and Si are differentiable by hypothesis, we conclude that T−i is differentiable for
q ∈ int(Q). Because this is true for every i ∈ N , it follows that ti is differentiable on
int(Q).
Condition (4.5) follows from differentiability and incentive compatibility. Condi-
tions (4.6) and (4.7) follow from differentiability and Theorem 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, t(q(θˆi)) = 0 immediately follows from the first
condition in (4.4).
Second, from the Proof of Proposition 3, we know that ti is differentiable on int(Q)
under the posited assumptions. At θˆi, we already know from the proof of Proposition
2 that q(θˆi) = q−i(θˆi). The output q(θˆi) = q−i(θˆi) ∈ int(Q) therefore satisfies the two
first-order conditions:
S ′0(q(θˆi)) + T
′
(q(θˆi)) = S
′
0(q(θˆi)) + T
′
−i(q(θˆi)) = θ.
From this, it immediately follows that t
′
i(q(θˆi)) = 0. Q.E.D.
The proof of Lemma 2 uses Lemma 10 below.
Lemma 10 For i ∈ A, the function θ 7→ F (θ) − sif(θ) is strictly increasing for
θ ∈ (θˆi, θ], and F (θ) − sif(θ) > 0 if and only if θ ∈ (θˆi, θ]. For i ∈ B, the function
θ 7→ F (θ) − sif(θ) is strictly increasing for θ ∈ [θ, θˆi), and F (θ) − sif(θ) > 1 if and
only if θ ∈ (θˆi, θ].
Proof of Lemma 10: Suppose i ∈ A. For θ = θ, F (θ) − sif(θ) < 0. If θˆi = θ,
then F (θ) − sif(θ) ≤ 0 over all Θ. If θˆi ∈ (θ, θ), then F (θˆi) − sif(θˆi) = 0. Because
F/f is increasing, F − sif > 0 if and only if θ > θˆi. The function F (θ) − sif(θ)
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is increasing if 1
si
> f
′(θ)
f(θ)
. The generalized monotone-hazard rate condition requires
f ′(θ)
f(θ)
< f(θ)
F (θ)
, and so F − sif is increasing if f(θ)F (θ) < 1si , which is true for all θ > θˆi.
Take i ∈ B. For θˆi = θ, the function F (θ) − sif(θ) > 1 for all θ ∈ Θ. Suppose
instead that θˆi ∈ (θ, θ). Then F (θˆi) − sif(θˆi) = 1 and the generalized monotone
hazard-rate condition implies F−sif > 1 if and only if θ > θˆi. The function F−sif is
increasing if f
′(θ)
f(θ)
> 1
si
. The generalized monotone-hazard rate condition also requires
f ′(θ)
f(θ)
> f(θ)
F (θ)−1 , and so F − sif is increasing if F (θ)−1f(θ) < si, which is true for all θ < θˆi.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Take now i ∈ A. Lemma 10 established that F (θ)−sif(θ) ≤
0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θˆi], and so for θ ≤ θˆi the fact that M i(θ) ≥ 0 implies si+ M i(θ)−F (θ)f(θ) ≥ 0
with all these inequalities being strict on [θ, θˆi). The definitions of q−i and q(θ) (from
Theorem 1) require
(A13) q−i(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq
(A14) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq +
(
si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
Taken together (A13) and (A14) yields q(θ) ≥ q−i(θ) for all θ ≤ θˆi.
Taking the concave hull of the maximands in (A13) and (A14),28 we get respectively
(A15) q−i(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈R
co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q)
)
,
(A16) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈R
co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q) +
(
si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
)
where ΨQ(q) =
{
0 if q ∈ Q
+∞ otherwise. Because of the linearity in q of the second-
bracketed term, we get
co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q) +
(
si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
)
= co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q)
)
+
(
si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q.
Hence, (A16) becomes
(A17) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈R
co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q)
)
+
(
si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q.
28Let f be a function. cof is the lowest concave function that majorizes f .
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Taking the subdifferential forms of (A15) and (A17), we get respectively
(A18) 0 ∈ ∂∗co(S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q))q−i(θ),
0 ∈ ∂∗
(
co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq + ΨQ(q)
)
+
(
si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q
)
q(θ)
(A19) = ∂∗co
(
S0(q) + T−i(q)− θq
)
q(θ)
+ si +
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
where the last equality follows from the“Sum Rule” of subdifferential calculus and the
fact that
(
si +
M i(θ)−F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q is differentiable in q. Taken together (A18) and (A19)
show that q−i(θ) 6= q(θ) for all θ < θˆi and thus q(θ) > q−i(θ) on [θ, θˆi). It follows that
principal i is active on that interval and M i(θ) = 0 on [θ, θˆi).
Because M i is left-continuous at θˆi, M i(θˆi) = 0 and it follows immediately that
q(θˆi) = q−i(θˆi).
Lastly, consider the region (θˆi, θ]. The pair (q,M) such that q(θ) = q−i(θ) and
M i(θ) = F (θ)− sif(θ) satisfies the necessary conditions of Theorem 1.
We conclude that the construction M i(θ) = max{F (θ) − sif(θ), 0} for i ∈ A sup-
ports q over Θ as required. A similar argument also establishes that, for i ∈ B, the
construction M i(θ) = min {F (θ)− sif(θ), 1} supports q over Θ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
Necessity. Proposition 2 in tandem with Theorem 2, implies that, for almost every
θ, the allocation satisfies
(A20) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q) + (β(θ)− θ)q + (n− 1)(S0(q)− θq + T (q)),
where T implements (q, U).
Denote
V(θ) = max
q∈Q
S0(q) + (β(θ)− θ)q + (n− 1)(S0(q)− θq + T (q)).
By definition, we have
V(θ) = S0(q(θ)) + (β(θ)− θ)q(θ) + (n− 1)U¯(θ).
Moreover, V is absolutely continuous as a value function. It is thus almost everywhere
differentiable and for any pair (θ, θ′), we get:
V(θ)− V(θ′) =
∫ θ
θ′
(β′(x)− n)q(x)dx.
But U¯ is itself absolutely continuous and such that
U¯(θ)− U¯(θ′) = −
∫ θ
θ′
q(x)dx.
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It follows that S0(q(θ)) + (β(θ)− θ)q(θ) is itself absolutely continuous with:
S0(q(θ)) + (β(θ)− θ)q(θ)− [S0(q(θ′)) + (β(θ′)− θ′)q(θ′)]
= V(θ) − V(θ′) − (n − 1) [U¯(θ)− U¯(θ′)]
or more simply
(A21) S0(q(θ))+(β(θ)−θ)q(θ)−[S0(q(θ′)) + (β(θ′)− θ′)q(θ′)] =
∫ θ
θ′
(β′(x)−1)q(x)dx.
We may conclude
S0(q(θ))+(β(θ)−θ)q(θ)−[S0(q(θ′)) + (β(θ)− θ)q(θ′)] =
∫ θ
θ′
(β′(x)−1)(q(x)−q(θ′))dx ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that β and q are both weakly non-
increasing. Hence, condition (5.1) holds.
Sufficiency. The proof of sufficiency proceeds by construction. The allocation q
satisfies (5.2) if and only if
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈R
(β(θ)− θ)q + S0(q) + ΨQ(q).
Because the program is concave, the necessary condition is also sufficient for char-
acterizing such a solution. Consider the agent’s response to the virtually truthful
schedules which are defined in Equations (5.6) and (5.7) in the text. The agent solves
max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq + T (q) = max
qR
S0(q)− θq + T (q) + ΨQ(q).
Because T is differentiable and S0 is concave, the local necessary and sufficient con-
dition for an optimal choice is
θ − T ′(q(θ)) ∈ ∂∗ (S0(q(θ) + ΨQ(q(θ))) .
Because q is non-decreasing, this local condition is also sufficient for implementability.
By construction, β(θ) = T
′
(q(θ)), and so we have the condition
θ − β(θ) ∈ ∂∗ (S0(q(θ)) + ΨQ(q(θ))) .
But this is the condition for a solution to (5.2), so we conclude that T implements q.
Consider principal i’s program in (3.2) where i ∈ A and M i is as in Proposition 2:
max
q∈R
(
S0(q) + T (q) + ΨQ(q)
)− ti(q)− θq + max{si − F (θ)
f(θ)
, 0
}
q.
We replace the first parenthetical expression with its concave hull co
(
S0(q) + T (q) + ΨQ(q)
)
.
Note that because T implements q, it follows that for all q ∈ Q
co
(
S0(q) + T (q) + ΨQ(q)
) ≥ S0(q) + T (q) + ΨQ(q),
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with equality for any q ∈ Q. This substitution increases the desirability of selecting
q 6∈ Q without changing the value of the maximand for q ∈ Q. Hence, if q is a solution
to this modified program, it is a solution to the original program. Thus, using βi(θ)
from above, we consider the following concave problem
max
q∈R
co
(
S0(q) + T (q) + ΨQ(q)
)− ti(q) + (βi(θ)− θ)q.
The necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is thus
θ − βi(θ) + t′i(q(θ)) ∈ ∂∗co
(
S0(q(θ)) + T (q(θ)) + ΨQ(q(θ))
)
.
By construction, βi(θ) = t
′
i(q(θ)), and so we have the simpler requirement that
θ ∈ ∂∗ co
(
S0(q) + T (q) + ΨQ(q)
)
,
which holds because q is implemented by T . Thus, the allocation q satisfies the opti-
mality condition (3.2) in Theorem 1, using the adjoint function M i from Proposition
2. By construction, principal i’s transfer function is positive if and only if M i(θ) is
constant, and so the complementary slackness condition (3.1) is also satisfied. We
conclude that it is optimal for principal i to implement the allocation q given the con-
tract aggregate T−i. The transfer which accomplishes this is exactly the constructed
ti above.
A similar argument applies to any principal i ∈ B.
Existence. Given that S0 is upper semi-continuous and Q is compact, a solution to
(5.2) always exists. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Step 1: From the proof of Theorem 3, we know that S0(q(θ)) + (β(θ)− θ)q(θ) is itself
absolutely continuous and thus a.e. differentiable. Using (A21) and differentiating
yields (5.3).
Step 2: Let θ be a point of discontinuity of q. We know that q(θ−) > q(θ+) by
incentive compatibility. To sustain an equilibrium allocation with such discontinuity,
the agent with type θ must be indifferent between choosing either q(θ−) or q(θ+), i.e.,
(A22) [S0(q) + T (q)− θq]q(θ
−)
q(θ+) = 0.
Using the optimality conditions (A20) at such discontinuity point, it must also be
that:
(A23) [(β(θ)− θ)q + S0(q) + (n− 1)(S0(q) + T (q)− θq)]q(θ
−)
q(θ+) = 0.
Inserting (A22) into (A23) yields (5.4). Because q is a.e. differentiable, such discon-
tinuity point is isolated and q is continuous and differentiable both on a right- and a
left-neighborhood of θ. Using Item [1.] in those intervals, we deduce that q˙(θ) = 0 on
such neighborhood. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: Because the distribution of θ converges in probability
to µ as κ→∞, we have for any ε > 0 and for every κ ≥ K(ε), F (µ + ε, κ)− F (µ−
ε, κ) ≥ 1− ε. Because si ≥ τ i(θ, κ),∫
Θ
(si − τ i(θ, κ)) f(θ, κ)dθ ≥ 0.
We want to show that this integral converges to zero. To this end, note∫
Θ
(si − τ i(θ, κ)) f(θ, κ)dθ =
∫ θ
θ
min
{
F (θ, κ)
f(θ, κ)
, si
}
f(θ, κ)dθ
≤
∫ µ−ε
θ
F (θ, κ)dθ +
∫ µ+ε
µ−ε
F (θ, κ)dθ +
∫ θ
µ+ε
sif(θ, κ)dθ
≤ (µ− ε− θ)ε+ 2ε+ siε.
Because ε can be made arbitrarily small as κ→∞, we may conclude that (5.8) holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: Theorem 3 requires that (5.2) holds for a separating
equilibrium. If S0 is linear, then the objective in the maximand of (5.2) is linear in
q. The maximum of a linear functional on a compact set (in this case, an interval
Q = [qmin, qmax]) is an extreme point if the linear function is not identically zero. The
construction of θˆ is such that for θ < θˆ, the maximand is a strictly increasing linear
function and for θ > θˆ, it is a strictly decreasing linear function. Equation (5.9)
follows. When θˆ is interior, it satisfies
β(θˆ) = θˆ.
If S0 is strictly concave, then the maximand of (5.2) is also strictly concave. It follows
that there is a unique q(θ) pointwise in θ and q is a continuous function. If S0 is
strictly concave and differentiable, q must be strictly decreasing in the interior of Θ
by Lemma 6, and hence it is separating. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: First, we denote by t
d
i (q) principal i’s equilibrium sched-
ule in a discontinuous equilibrium and by T
d
(q) the aggregate. Similar notations are
used for outputs. The proof is in several steps.
Step 1: For a discontinuous equilibrium, Q is a non-connected set. To simplify the
analysis, we construct an equilibrium with a unique discontinuity so that Q is made
of two disconnected intervals. Generalizations to more points of discontinuity are
immediate. Let also this discontinuity be at θ0 and denote q
d(θ+0 ) and q
d(θ−0 ) the right-
and left-hand side limits of qd at θ0. Incentive compatibility implies that q
d(θ+0 ) <
qd(θ−0 ).
29
On each connected subset Q2 = [q(θ¯), q
d(θ+0 )] and Q1 = [q
d(θ−0 ), q(θ)], Proposition
7 holds. Several facts immediately follow.
29The choice of having either q(θ0) = q
d(θ+0 ) or and q(θ0) = q
d(θ−0 ) is arbitrary.
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Fact 1. q : Θ→ Q is not only continuous but also separating on the interiors int(Qj)
(j = 1, 2). Hence, we know that ϑ(q) is unambiguously defined on int(Qj). Moreover,
for any θ such that q(θ) ∈ int(Qj), q solves
(A24) q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Qj
S0(q) + (β(θ)− θ)q.
For any q(θ) ∈ int(Qj), strict concavity of the above maximand yields
(A25) S ′0(q(θ)) + β(θ)− θ = 0
which also implicitly defines ϑ(q).
Fact 2. From Fact 1, it follows that the equilibrium tariffs have the following margins:
(A26) t
d′
i (q) = βi(ϑ(q)) for any q ∈ int(Qj).
Fact 3. By construction qd(θ−0 ) ∈ Q1 and qd(θ+0 ) ∈ Q2. There exists θ1 < θ0 such that
θ1 = ϑ(q
d(θ−0 )) and θ2 > θ0 such that θ2 = ϑ(q
d(θ+0 )).
Step 2: At such discontinuity θ0, (A23) holds and the “aggregate objective” specified
in (A20) is constant across this discontinuity.
Step 3: Let us now take a continuous equilibrium say q which is virtually-truthful.
We modify this equilibrium to construct a discontinuous equilibrium qd having a
discontinuity at a given θ0. We build the equilibrium tariffs to obtain that principal
i’s virtual surplus defined as
W˜i(θ, q) = (βi(θ)− θ)q + S0(q) + td−i(q)
remains linear over the interval [qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )].
30 This is this expression which is
maximized pointwise at a best response as shown in Theorem 1 once one takes the
expressions of adjoint functions coming from Lemma 2.
Equilibrium tariffs. Let principal −i’s schedule over [qd(θ+0 ), qd(θ−0 )] be
(A27) t
d
−i(q) = t
d
−i(q
d(θ−0 ))− [(βi(θ0)− θ0)q + S0(q)]qqd(θ−0 ) ∀q ∈ [q
d(θ−0 ), q
d(θ+0 )].
On Q1 and Q2 respectively, the tariff is respectively defined as
(A28) t
d
−i(q) = t
d
−i(q
d(θ+0 )) +
∫ q
qd(θ+0 )
β
i
(ϑ(z))dz
and
(A29) t
d
−i(q) = t
d
−i(q
d(θ−0 )) +
∫ q
qd(θ−0 )
β
i
(ϑ(z))dz.
30 The construction is easier when n = 2 but could be generalized for n > 2 at the cost of some
notational burden.
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where t
d
−i(q
d(θ+0 )) is defined from (A27). Note that t
d
−i(q) so constructed is continuous
not only on [qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )] but everywhere on Q. Also t
d
−i(q) is differentiable on
(qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )) and on the interior of Q1 and Q2. Moreover, we have
lim
q→qd(θ−0 )−
t
d′
−i(q) = −(βi(θ0)− θ0)− S ′0(qd(θ−0 )) = β−i(θ1) + βi(θ1)− θ1 − (βi(θ0)− θ0)
≥ β−i(θ1) = td
′
−i(q
d(θ−0 ))
lim
q→qd(θ+0 )+
t
d′
−i(q) = −(βi(θ0)− θ0)− S ′0(qd(θ+0 )) = β−i(θ2) + βi(θ2)− θ2 − (βi(θ0)− θ0)
≤ β−i(θ2) = td
′
−i(q
d(θ+0 ))
where the two above inequalities follow from the fact that βi(·) is weakly decreasing.
Principal i’s best response. We are now ready to compute for any θ ∈ Θ,
qd(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
W˜i(θ, q).
• Consider θ ∈ [θ, θ1] and observe then that
(A30) q(θ) = arg max
q∈Q1
W˜i(θ, q).
Moreover, for q ∈ Q2, we have
(A31)
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ, q) = βi(θ)− θ + S ′0(q) + β−i(ϑ(q)).
Because the generalized monotone hazard rate property holds, we have βi(θ) − θ ≥
βi(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) for θ ≤ ϑ(q) and q ≤ q(θ+0 ). Inserting into (A31) yields
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ0, q) ≥ S ′0(q) + β1(ϑ(q)) + β2(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) = 0 for q ≤ qd(θ−0 ).
Hence, we get
(A32) q(θ+0 ) = arg max
q∈Q2
W˜i(θ, q).
Finally, consider q ∈ [qd(θ+0 ), qd(θ−0 )] and observe that
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ, q) = βi(θ)− θ − (βi(θ0)− θ0) ≥ 0
where the last inequality follows from βi(·) being weakly decreasing and θ ≤ θ1 < θ0.
Hence, we get:
(A33) q(θ−0 ) = arg max
q∈Q2
W˜i(θ, q).
40 D. MARTIMORT, L. STOLE
Putting together (A30), (A32) and (A33), we finally obtain:
(A34) qd(θ) = q(θ).
A similar argument shows again that, for any θ ∈ [θ2, θ], (A34) holds.
• Consider θ ∈ [θ1, θ0). The same arguments as above show that W˜i(θ, q) is increasing
over Q2
⋃
[qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )]. Moreover, for q ∈ Q1 (i.e., for q ≥ qd(θ−0 )), we have
(A35)
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ, q) = βi(θ)− θ + S ′0(q) + β−i(ϑ(q)).
Because the generalized monotone hazard rate property holds, we have βi(θ) − θ ≤
βi(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) for θ ≥ θ1 ≥ ϑ(q). Inserting into (A35) yields
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ, q) ≤ S ′0(q) + β1(ϑ(q)) + β2(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) = 0 for q ≥ qd(θ−0 ) = q(θ1).
Hence, we get:
(A36) q(θ−0 ) = arg max
q∈Q2
W˜i(θ, q) = arg max
q∈Q
W˜i(θ, q).
A similar argument shows that, for any θ ∈ (θ0, θ2], we have:
(A37) q(θ+0 ) = arg max
q∈Q
W˜i(θ, q).
• Consider now θ0. By construction, each principal is indifferent between inducing
qd(θ+0 ) and q
d(θ−0 ). Indeed, the construction of t−i(q) in (A27) is such that principal i’s
virtual surplus is constant over the whole interval [qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )], W˜i(θ0, q) = W˜i(θ0)
for any q ∈ [qd(θ+0 ), qd(θ−0 )] where
W˜i(θ0) = (βi(θ0)− θ0)qd(θ+0 ) + S0(qd(θ+0 )) + td−i(qd(θ+0 ))
= (βi(θ0)− θ0)qd(θ−0 ) + S0(qd(θ−0 )) + td−i(qd(θ−0 )).
Consider now q ≥ qd(θ−0 ), we have:
(A38)
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ0, q) = βi(θ0)− θ0 + S ′0(q) + β−i(ϑ(q)).
Because, again, the generalized monotone hazard rate property holds, we have βi(θ0)−
θ0 ≤ βi(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) for θ0 ≥ θ1 ≥ ϑ(q). Inserting into (A38) yields
(A39)
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ0, q) ≤ S ′0(q) + β1(ϑ(q)) + β2(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) = 0 for q ≥ qd(θ−0 ) = q(θ1).
A symmetric argument shows also that
(A40)
∂W˜i
∂q
(θ0, q) ≥ S ′0(q) + β1(ϑ(q)) + β2(ϑ(q))− ϑ(q) = 0 for q ≤ qd(θ+0 ) = q(θ2).
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Putting together (A39) and (A40) shows that
[qd(θ+0 ), q
d(θ−0 )] = arg max
q∈Q
W˜i(θ, q).
Agent’s behavior. We are now ready to compute for any θ ∈ Θ,
qd(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈Q
S0(q)− θq + T d(q).
• The first obvious observation is that, for θ ∈ [θ, θ1]
⋃
[θ2, θ], we have q
d(θ) = q(θ).
• For θ ∈ [θ1, θ0), we have qd(θ−0 ) = arg maxq∈Q S0(q) − θq + T d(q), whereas, for
θ ∈ (θ0, θ2], we have instead qd(θ+0 ) = arg maxq∈Q S0(q)− θq + T d(q).
• Finally, for θ = θ0, the definitions of ti(q) given in (A27) imply that the agent is
indifferent between qd(θ−0 ) and q
d(θ+0 ). Indeed, we have[
S0(q)− θ0q + T d(q)
]qd(θ−0 )
qd(θ+0 )
= [S0(q) + (β(θ0)− θ0)q]q
d(θ−0 )
qd(θ+0 )
= 0
where the last equality follows from (5.4).
Moreover, it is easy to check that any other output choice gives a lower payoff to
the agent.
Non-negativeness of the tariffs. This is where the assumption that the discontinuity is
small enough matters. Starting from a continuous equilibrium where both principals
are active at θ0, the modifications of the transfers in (A27) are still non-negative. It
is enough for that that the discontinuity jump qd(θ−0 )− qd(θ+0 ) be kept small enough.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9: Equation (6.1) describes the unique solution to (5.2).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: Equation (6.2) follows from (5.9). Consider the trans-
fers ti(q) = max
{
si − F (θˆ)f(θˆ) , 0
}
q, i ∈ N.An agent will choose q = 1 only if∑i∈N ti(1) ≥
θ, or
∑
i∈N max
{
si − F (θˆ)f(θˆ) , 0
}
≥ θ, and will choose q = 0 if the inequality fails. Given
the definition of θˆ, q in (6.2) is implementable for these transfers.
Now consider principal i’s program, taking the transfers of principals j 6= i as given.
We need to demonstrate
q(θ) ∈ arg max
q∈[0,1]
(
si +
(∑
j 6=i
max
{
sj − F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
, 0
}
− θ
)
+
M i(θ)− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
q.
Since M i(θ) = max {F (θ)− f(θ)sj, 0}, we have si + M i(θ)−F (θ)f(θ) = max
{
si − F (θ)f(θ) , 0
}
and the solution to the above program is (6.2). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 11: Equation (6.4) follows immediately as the unique so-
lution to (5.2) for the case of n = 2. When θ is uniformly distributed, F (θ)
f(θ)
= θ + δ,
and 1−F (θ)
f(θ)
= θ − δ. Define then
q1(θ) ≡ s1 −
F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ = s1 − δ − 2θ,
q2(θ) ≡ s2 +
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ = s2 + δ − 2θ,
q12(θ) ≡ s1 + s2 −
F (θ)
f(θ)
+
1− F (θ)
f(θ)
− θ = s1 + s2 − 3θ.
Let θ1 be the solution to q1(θ1) = q12(θ1) if such a root exists and θ1 = −δ otherwise.
Thus, θ1 = max{−δ, s2 + δ}. Similarly, define θ2 by q2(θ2) = q12(θ2) if such a root
exists and θ2 = δ otherwise. Thus, θ2 = min{s1 − δ, δ}. It follows that principal 1 is
active over the set Θ1 = [−δ, θ2) and principal 2 is active over Θ2 = (θ1, δ]. These
sets overlap if and only if θ1 < θ2, i.e., max{−δ, s2 + δ} < min{s1 − δ, δ}. This holds
if and only if s1 − δ > s2 + δ or (given that s2 < 0) δ < s1+|s2|2 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12: The proof is in three steps. Note that when δ < 1
2
,
both principals are active in the virtually-truthful equilibrium where q = −3θ.
Symmetry of the discontinuity jump. First, observe that any discontinuity must pre-
serve the aggregate virtual surplus of the principals at type θ0 = 0 where the discon-
tinuity lies. In this lobbying example, this aggregate virtual surplus is:
(max {1− δ − θ0, 0}+ min {−1 + δ − θ0, 0} − θ0) q − q
2
2
≡ −q
2
2
which is clearly symmetric around the origin. Hence, the discontinuity jumps are of
the form qd(θ−0 ) = −qd(θ+0 ) = q0.
Discontinuity jump. Proposition 8 constructs such discontinuity on an interval where
both principals are active which implies q0 ∈ (0, 3(1− δ)). We describe the condition
for non-negative transfers below to reduce the relevant interval for q0.
Non-negative payments. We now provide a condition on q0 that ensures that the
equilibrium transfers t
d
i (q) in the discontinuous equilibria remain positive on [−q0, q0].
To do so, we focus on the tariff t
d
2(q) offered by principal 2 and use symmetry to
complete the construction. From the proof of Proposition 8 and especially (A27) we
know that
(A41)
t
d
2(q) = t
d
2(q0)−
[
β1(0)q − q
2
2
]q
q0
= t
d
2(q0)+(1−δ)q0−
q20
2
−(1−δ)q+q
2
2
for all q ∈ [−q0, q0]
since β1(0) = 1− δ. On the other hand, principal 2 starts to be active at θ = −1 + δ
and:
t
d
2(q0) =
∫ q0
3(1−δ)
β2(ϑ(y))dy =
∫ q0
3(1−δ)
(
−1 + δ + y
3
)
dy = −(1− δ)q0 + q
2
0
6
+
3
2
(1− δ)2.
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Inserting this expression into (A41) yields
(A42) t
d
2(q) =
q2
2
− (1− δ)q − q
2
0
3
+
3
2
(1− δ)2 for all q ∈ [−q0, q0].
Observe that
min{q0, 1− δ} = arg min
q∈[−q0,q0]
t
d
2(q).
Two cases must be studied. When q0 < 1− δ, we have minq∈[−q0,q0] td2(q) = td2(q0) > 0.
When q0 ≥ 1− δ(> −q0), we have instead minq∈[−q0,q0] td2(q) = td2(1− δ) = (1− δ)2− q
2
0
3
which is non-negative when q0 ≤ (1− δ)
√
3.
Welfare. Fix q0 ∈ [0, (1− δ)
√
3] and observe that the expected welfare in the equilib-
rium with a discontinuity jump q0 is
W(q0) = − 1
4δ
(∫ − q0
3
−δ
q2(θ)dθ +
∫ q0
3
− q0
3
q20dθ +
∫ δ
q0
3
q2(θ)dθ
)
.
Optimizing with respect to q0 immediately yields W ′(q0) = − q
2
0
3δ
so that W(q0) is
maximized at q0 = 0, i.e., for the continuous equilibrium. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B: NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR NON-SMOOTH
OPTIMAL CONTROL WITH A LINEAR STATE VARIABLE
We are interested in the following pure-state control program (P):
Maximize Λ(x) ≡ ∫ 1
0
(S(θ, u(θ))− x(θ)f(θ)) dθ
subject to x ∈ AC(Θ,R), x˙(θ) = u(θ), x(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ ≡ [0, 1].
The constraints require that the state variable x is a non-negative, absolutely con-
tinuous function, x ∈ AC(Θ,R). x is said admissible if it satisfies these constraints.
Note that the integrand L(θ, x, u) = (S(θ, u) − x)f(θ) is linear in x and that the
state constraint, x ≥ 0, is independent of θ. These two restrictions within the class of
state-constrained, non-smooth optimal control problems are the source of many sharp
results in the analysis that follows.
We assume that S(θ, ·) is an upper-semi continuous function bounded from above
and that f(θ) is a positive and bounded from above function so that F (θ) ≡ ∫
[θ,θ]
f(θ)
is absolutely continuous. Without loss of generality, we normalize f such that F (1) =
1 and interpret F as a continuous probability distribution. Lastly, we assume that
S(·, ·) is L×B-measurable, where L denotes the set of Lebesgue measurable subsets of
Θ and B is the set of Borel measurable subsets of R. Importantly, we do not assume
a priori that S(θ, ·) is a continuous function. We present our main result for this class
of problems.
Theorem B.1 x is a solution to program (P) if and only if x is admissible and there
exists a probability measure µ defined over the Borel subsets of Θ with an associated
adjoint function, M : Θ→ [0, 1], defined by M(θ) = 0 and for θ > θ,
M(θ) ≡
∫
[θ,θ)
µ(ds),
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such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
(B1) supp {µ} ⊆ {θ |x(θ) = 0} ,
(B2) x˙(θ) ∈ arg max
v∈R
S(θ, v) + (F (θ)−M(θ))v, for a.e. θ ∈ Θ.
Furthermore, if
y(θ, σ) ≡ arg max
v∈R
S(θ, v) + (F (θ)− σ)v
is single-valued and continuous over the domain (θ, σ) ∈ Θ× [0, 1], then the solution
x to (P) is continuously differentiable.
Remarks:
• Theorem 1 is very similar to Theorem 1 in Jullien (2000). In both theorems, neces-
sary and sufficient conditions are stated in terms of a probability measure which serves
to express a “complementary slackness condition” (B1) and an optimality condition
(B2). Moreover, both theorems use a similar condition to establish the continuity of
x˙(θ) in the solution to (P). Jullien’s Theorem, however, uses the stronger hypothesis
that S(·) is twice continuously differentiable. Our technical contribution is to weaken
these hypotheses to requirements of upper semi-continuity. This generalization al-
lows us to apply the necessary and sufficient conditions above to our class of common
agency games with upper-semi continuous contract menus.
• The condition that y(θ, σ) is single-valued and continuous is implied by the strict
concavity of S(θ, ·). It is also implied by the weaker condition in Jullien (2000,
Assumption 2) that S(θ, v)−(σ−F (θ))v is strictly quasi-concave in v for any σ ∈ [0, 1].
• The adjoint function M(θ). Note in particular that the function M is constructed
to be left-continuous rather than right-continuous.
Proof of Theorem B.1:
Overview. We prove necessity by specializing Theorem 3 from Vinter and Zheng
(1998), exploiting fact that our integrand in Λ is a linear function of x and that the
state constraint x(θ) ≥ 0 is linear and independent of θ. Sufficiency is proven by
generalizing Arrow’s Sufficiency Theorem to non-smooth optimal control problems
and specializing the theorem to the case in which the objective integrand is a linear
function of x. The regularity of the optimal solution follows from arguments involving
the necessary conditions. While the proof seems straightforward when viewed from
this broad vantage point, a considerable investment in concepts and notation from
non-smooth, non-convex analysis is required along the way.
Preliminaries for Non-Smooth Analysis. We first introduce some additional
notation. We draw heavily from Vinter and Zheng (1998) in the following presenta-
tion.31
31 A complete treatment can be found in the monograph of Vinter (2000). Theorem 3 from Vinter
and Zheng (1998) appears as Theorem 10.2.1 in Vinter (2000).
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Take a closed set A ⊆ Rk and a point x ∈ A. A vector p ∈ Rk is a limiting normal
to A at x if there exists a sequence (xi, pi)→ (x, p) and a K ≥ 0 such that for each i
in the sequence pi · |xi− x| ≤ K|xi− x|2. The cone of limiting normal vectors to A at
x is denoted NA(x). Given a lower semi-continuous function g : Rk → R∪{+∞} and
a point x ∈ Rk such that g(x) < +∞, the limiting subdifferential of g at x is defined
as
∂g(x) ≡ {ξ | (ξ,−1) ∈ Nepi{g}(x, g(x))},
where epi{g} is the epigraph of the function g defined as
epi{g} ≡ {(x, α) ∈ Rk × R |α ≥ g(x)}.
The asymptotic limiting subdifferential of g at x, written ∂∞g(x), is defined as
∂∞g(x) ≡ {ξ | (ξ, 0) ∈ Nepi{g}(x, g(x))}.
Two results from nonsmooth analysis (e.g., Vinter (2000), Propositions 4.3.3 and
4.3.4) that we use are (1) ∂∞g(x) = {0} if g is Lipschitz continuous and (2) for any
x such that g(x) is finite,
Nepi{g}(x, g(x)) = {(ξd,−ξ) | ξ > 0 d ∈ ∂g(x)} ∪ {∂∞g(x)× {0}}.
We denote the Euclidean norm in Rk by | · |, and denote the norm on the space of
absolutely continuous functions by
||x|| ≡ |x(θ)|+
∫
Θ
|x˙(θ)|dθ.
A local maximizer of Λ(x) is a feasible arc, x, which maximizes Λ(x) over all feasible
arcs x ∈ AC(Θ,R+) within an ε neighborhood of x,
||x− x|| ≤ ε.
A local minimizer is defined analogously.
Necessity. For completeness, we state Theorem 3 of Vinter and Zheng (1998) which
provides necessary conditions for solutions to the following minimization program:
(P ′) : Minimize J(x) ≡ ∫ θ
θ
L(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ))dθ
subject to x ∈ AC(Θ,R) and h(θ, x(θ)) ≤ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ ≡ [θ, θ].32
Theorem B.2 (Vinter and Zheng (1998), Theorem 3) Let x be a AC local minimizer
for (P ′) such that J(x) < +∞. Assume that the following hypotheses are satisfied:
H1. L(·, x, ·) is L×B measureable for each x and L(θ, ·, ·) is lower semi-continuous
for a.e. θ ∈ Θ.
32 We specialize their theorem to our present problem in which the range of x(θ) is one-dimensional
and there is no endpoint cost function.
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H2. For every K > 0 there exists δ > 0 and k ∈ L1 such that
|L(θ, x′, v)− L(θ, x, v)| ≤ k(θ)|x′ − x|, L(θ, x(θ), v) ≥ −k(θ)
for a.e. θ ∈ Θ, for all x, x′ ∈ x(θ) + δB and v ∈ x˙(θ) +KB, where B is a unit
Euclidean ball.
H3. h is upper semi-continuous near (θ, x(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ, and there exists a
constant kh such that
|h(θ, x′)− h(θ, x)| ≤ kh|x′ − x|
for all θ ∈ Θ and all x′, x ∈ x(θ) + δB.
Then there exist an arc p ∈ AC, a constant λ ≥ 0, a non-negative measure µ on the
Borel subsets of Θ and a µ-integrable function γ : Θ→ R, such that
(i). λ + maxθ∈Θ |p(θ)| +
∫
Θ
µ(ds) = K > 0 (where K is an arbitrary normalization
constant),33
(ii).
p˙(θ) ∈ co
{
η | (η, p(θ) +
∫
[θ,θ)
γ(s)µ(ds),−λ)
∈ Nepi{L(θ,·,·)}(x(θ), x˙(θ), L(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ)))
}
a.e.,
(iii).
p(θ) = p(θ)−
∫
Θ
γ(s)µ(ds) = 0,
(iv). (
p(θ) +
∫
[θ,θ)
γ(s)µ(ds)
)
· x˙(θ)− λL(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ))
≥
(
p(θ) +
∫
[θ,θ)
γ(s)µ(ds)
)
· v − λL(θ, x(θ), v)
for all v ∈ R a.e.,
(v). γ(θ) ∈ ∂>x h(θ, x(θ)) µ-a.e. and supp{µ} ⊆ {t |h(θ, x(θ)) = 0}, where
∂>x h(θ, x) ≡ co{lim
i
ξi | ∃ti → t, xi → x such that
h(θ, xi) > 0 and ξi ∈ ∂xh(ti, xi) for all i}.
We apply this result to our setting by substituting xf(θ) − S(θ, v) in program
(P) in place of L(θ, x, v) and thereby converting the maximization functional Λ in
program (P) to the minimization functional J in program (P ′). We complete the
33We choose to state the Theorem using K > 0 as an arbitrary normalization rather than K = 1,
which is the normalization chosen in Vinter and Zheng (1998). Later, by setting K = 3, we will
succeed in normalizing µ to a probability measure which is a more familiar object.
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transformation by requiring that h(θ, x) = −x, and that L(θ, x, v) is a linear function
of x for any (θ, v).
First, we verify that hypotheses H1-H3 are satisfied for our program (P). Because
S(θ, ·) is upper semi-continuous and B-measurable, and because L(θ, x, v) is linear in
x, H1 is satisfied. H2 requires that L(θ, ·, v) is Lipschitz continuous, which is trivial
given that L is linear in x with coefficient f(θ). Because the transformed program has
h(θ, x) = −x, h is a continuous linear functional of x and thus H3 is also satisfied.
Next, we specialize the conclusions of Vinter and Zheng (1998) my making use of
the additional restrictions on L(·) and h(·). We present this in the following Lemma.
Lemma 11 Suppose that L(θ, x, v) is a linear function of x and that h(θ, x) = −x.
Then the conclusions (i)-(v) of Theorem B.2 imply
(a). λ+ maxθ∈Θ |p(θ)|+
∫
Θ
µ(ds) = K > 0,
(b). p˙(θ) = λf(θ) a.e.,
(c). p(θ) = p(θ) +
∫
Θ
γ(s)µ(ds) = 0
(d). x˙(θ) ∈ arg maxv∈R
(
p(θ) +
∫
[θ,θ)
γ(s)µ(ds)
)
· v + λS(θ, v), a.e.,
(e). γ(θ) = −1 µ-a.e. and supp{µ} ⊆ {t |h(θ, x(θ)) = 0}.
Proof of Lemma 11: Implications (i) and (a) are identical. Implication (ii) re-
quires almost everywhere that
p˙(θ) ∈ co
{
η |
(
η, p(θ) +
∫
[S,t)
γ(s)µ(ds),−λ
)
∈ Nepi(L(θ,·,·))
(
x, x˙, L(θ, x, x˙)
)}
.
Because L(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ)) = f(θ)x(θ)− S(θ, x˙(θ)) is finite, the limiting normal cone in
the above expression can be written as
Nepi(L(θ,·,·))
(
x, x˙, L
)
=
{
(ξd1, ξd2,−ξ) | ξ > 0, (d1, d2) ∈ ∂
(
f(θ) · x(θ)− S(θ, x˙(θ)))}⋃{
∂∞
(
f(θ) · x(θ)− S(θ, x˙(θ)))× {0}} .
Using the fact that L(·) is additively separable in x and x˙, a basic chain rule for lower
semi-continuous functions (RW, Proposition 10.5) yields
∂
(
f(θ)x(θ)− S(θ, x˙(θ))) = ∂ (f(θ)x(θ))× ∂ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))
=
{
f(θ)× ∂ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))} ,
and
∂∞
(
f(θ)x(θ)− S(θ, x˙(θ))) ⊆ ∂∞ (f(θ)x(θ))× ∂∞ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))
=
{{0} × ∂∞ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))} ,
where the last equality uses the fact that a linear function is Lipschitz continuous and
hence ∂∞(f(θ)x(θ)) = {0}. Substituting these subdifferentials into the expression for
the limiting normal cone, we have a simple inclusion:
Nepi(L(θ,·,·))
(
x, x˙, L
) ⊆ {(ξf(θ), ξd2,−ξ) | ξ > 0, d2 ∈ ∂ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))}⋃{{0} × ∂∞ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))× {0}} .
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This simplifies yet again to the inclusion
Nepi(L(θ,·,·))
(
x, x˙, L
)
⊆ {(ξf(θ), ξd2,−ξ) | ξ ≥ 0, d2 ∈ ∂ (−S(θ, x˙(θ))) ∪ ∂∞ (−S(θ, x˙(θ)))} .
The key point to note is that any vector in the limiting normal cone must point in the
same direction in the (x, L) plane, regardless of d2. Returning to implication (ii), we
see that any point η in the given convex hull must satisfy (η, ·,−λ) = (ξf(θ), ·,−ξ)
for some ξ ≥ 0, and hence the convex hull reduces to {λf(θ)}. We conclude that im-
plication (ii) simplifies to implication (b) given that L(·) is both additively separable
and linear in x.
Implication (iii) is identical to implication (c).
Using the transformation L(θ, x, v) = xf(θ) − S(θ, v), implication (iv) simpli-
fies to implication (d). Lastly, the fact that h(θ, x) = −x yields ∂xh(θ, x(θ)) =
∂>x h(θ, x(θ)) = {−1}. Thus, implication (v) simplifies to γ(θ) = −1 µ-a.e. and
supp{µ} ⊆ {t |x(θ) = 0}. This is implication (e). Q.E.D.
An immediate inspection of conditions (a)-(e) suggest further simplifications by
combining these conditions. Conditions (b) and (c) jointly yield
p(θ) = λF (θ).
Because p(θ) = λ and γ(θ) = −1 a.e. with respect to µ, condition (c) also implies∫
Θ
µ(ds) = λ.
Because we also have maxθ∈Θ |p(θ)| = λ, condition (a) implies λ > 0 and in particular
λ = K
3
. Because the choice of K is arbitrary, we choose K = 3 as a normalization,
yielding λ = 1 and
∫
Θ
µ(ds) = 1. Thus, the normalization makes µ a probability
measure on Θ. Defining M(θ) =
∫
[θ,θ)
µ(ds), the implication in (d) is therefore
x˙(θ) ∈ arg max
v∈R
S(θ, v) +
(
F (θ)−M(θ)) v, a.e.,
which is condition (B2) of Theorem B.1. Lastly, the implication of (e) delivers the
complementary slackness condition (B1). We have therefore proven the necessity of
the conditions in Theorem B.1.
Sufficiency: We adapt the argument of Arrow’s Sufficiency Theorem using the
basic approach of Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987) but relaxing their continuity and
smoothness assumptions.
Let x be any admissible arc: x ∈ AC(Θ,R) and x(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Define
∆ =
∫
Θ
{(
S(θ, x˙(θ))− x(θ)f(θ))− (S(θ, x˙(θ))− x(θ)f(θ))} dθ.
We will demonstrate that, under conditions (B1) and (B2) of Theorem B.1, ∆ ≥ 0.
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To this end, it is useful to define the Hamiltonian for program (P) using M(θ)−F (θ)
as the adjoint equation which satisfies conditions(B1) and (B2):
H(θ, x, v) ≡ S(θ, v)− x · f(θ)− (M(θ)− F (θ)) · v.
Note that M(θ) is defined for θ ∈ (θ, θ] and thus H(·) inherits the same domain.
Nonetheless, because µ is not part of expression of ∆ and F is absolutely continuous,
we can ignore the point θ in the integral and conclude that
∆ =
∫
(θ,θ]
(
H(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ))−H(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ))) dθ +∫
Θ
(F (θ)−M(θ)) (x˙(θ)−x˙(θ)) dθ.
Define the optimized Hamiltonian as
Hˆ(θ, x) ≡ sup
v∈R
H(θ, x, v).
Because M(θ) − F (θ) is bounded on (θ, θ] and S(θ, ·) is bounded from above by
assumption, we note that Hˆ(·) must be finite. Condition (B2) implies that
Hˆ(θ, x(θ)) = H(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ))
and for any admissible x ∈ AC(Θ;R+),
Hˆ(θ, x(θ)) ≥ H(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ)).
Combining these facts, we obtain
H(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ))−H(θ, x(θ), x˙(θ)) ≥ Hˆ(θ, x(θ))− Hˆ(θ, x(θ))
= f(θ)(x(θ)− x(θ)).
The last statement relies fundamentally on the linearity of H(·) in x. Substituting
into the previous statement for ∆, we have
∆ ≥
∫
(θ,θ]
f(θ)(x(θ)− x(θ))dθ +
∫
Θ
(F (θ)−M(θ)) (x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ
=
∫
Θ
(
f(θ)(x(θ)−x(θ))+F (θ) (x˙(θ)−x˙(θ))) dθ−∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)−x˙(θ)) dθ
=
∫
Θ
d
dθ
[F (θ)(x(θ)− x(θ))]dθ −
∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ
= (x(1)− x(1))−
∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ.
It follows that ∆ ≥ 0 if
(x(1)− x(1))−
∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ ≥ 0.
If M were absolutely continuous, we would be able to integrate the second term by
parts and reach such a conclusion. Because M is possibly discontinuous, we must pro-
ceed more carefully. Note that M is non-decreasing on (θ, θ] with at most a countable
number of upward jump discontinuities. Furthermore, M is absolutely continuous
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elsewhere, allowing us to integrate by parts between any pair of discontinuities. Also
note that at any such upward jump point, τ , M is left and right continuous with
M(τ) < M(τ+) and (by condition (B1)) we have x(τ+) = 0.
Denote the set of jump discontinuities by {τ1, τ2, . . .}, a possibly infinite set. Let I
be the index set of τi. Between any two points τi and τi+1, we know∫
(τi,τi+1]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ
= M(θ)(x(θ)− x(θ))∣∣τi+1
t=τ+i
−
∫
(τi,τi+1)
(x(θ)− x(θ))µ(θ)dθ
= M(τi+1)(x(τi+1)− x(τi+1))−M(τ+i )(x(τi)− x(τi))
−
∫
(τi,τi+1)
(x(θ)− x(θ))µ(θ)dθ.
The second equality above uses the fact that x and x are continuous on Θ.
Define the size of the jump discontinuity at τ by d(τ) = M(τ+)−M(τ) > 0. Then
we may write∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ
=
∑
i∈I
M(τi+1)(x(τi+1)− x(τi+1))− (d(τi) +M(τi))(x(τi)− x(τi))
−
∫
(τi,τi+1)
(x(θ)− x(θ))µ(θ)dθ
= (x(1)− x(1))−
∑
i∈I
d(τi)(x(τi)− x(τi))−
∫
(τi,τi+1)
(x(θ)− x(θ))µ(θ)dθ.
By complementary slackness in condition (B1), we know x(θ)µ(θ) = 0 and at any
jump point τ we must have x(τ) = 0. Thus,∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ = (x(1)− x(1))−∑
i∈I
d(τi)x(τi)−
∫
(τi,τi+1)
x(θ)µ(θ)dθ.
We deduce
∆ ≥ (x(1)− x(1))−
∫
(θ,θ]
M(θ)
(
x˙(θ)− x˙(θ)) dθ
=
∑
i∈I
d(τi)x(τi) +
∫
(τi,τi+1)
x(θ)µ(θ)dθ.
Because x(θ) ≥ 0, µ is a non-negative measure, and jump discontinuities d(τi) are
positive, we conclude ∆ ≥ 0 as claimed. We have proven that conditions (B1) and
(B2) are sufficient for a solution.
Smoothness of the solution, x: We add the hypothesis that
y(θ, σ) ≡ arg max
v∈R
S(θ, v) + (F (θ)− σ)v
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is single-valued and continuous for (θ, σ) ∈ Θ × [0, 1]. It follows that y(θ, σ) is non-
increasing in σ and from condition (B2), that x˙(θ) = q(θ,M(θ)) a.e.
Suppose to the contrary that x˙ is discontinuous at some point τ ∈ Θ. Initially,
suppose that Condition (B2) is extended to hold for all θ ∈ Θ rather than for a.e.
θ ∈ (θ, θ]; call this Condition (B2’). Condition (B2’) and the additional hypothesis
that y(θ, σ) is continuous in (θ, σ) jointly imply that x˙(θ) is discontinuous at τ only
if M is also discontinuous at τ . Any discontinuity in M , however, must be an up-
ward jump, d(τ) = M(τ+) −M(τ) > 0, implying that x˙(θ) must jump downwards.
Complementary slackness (condition (B1), however, imposes that x(τ) = 0, with the
implication that a downward discontinuity at τ would violate the state constraint
x(θ) ≥ 0 in the neighborhood to the immediate right of τ . Hence, continuity must
hold for all points θ ∈ [θ, θ) under Condition (B2’). Furthermore, because M is left
continuous at t = 1, no jump in x˙(θ) is possible at this endpoint. We conclude that
Condition (B2’) implies that x˙(θ) is continuous for all θ ∈ Θ. The weaker Condi-
tion (B2) allows x˙(θ) to violate the maximization condition on sets of measure zero,
including at θ = θ. But such violations have no effect on the solution x which is
absolutely continuous. Thus, x is smooth as posited. Q.E.D.
